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T7i i i

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j) (1996) and Rule 42 of the Utah Rides of Appellate Procedure.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Appellant/Cross-Appellee is Plaintiff William Anthony Kraatz, referred to as
"Kraatz."

Appellee and Cross-Appellant is Heritage Imports, dba Heritage Honda

("Heritage"). All claims against Defendants O. Bryan Wilkinson ("B. Wilkinson") and
Jeffrey J. Wilkinson (MJJ. Wilkinson") were dismissed, and no appeal was taken from
their dismissal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Heritage has reviewed the issues raised by Kraatz, which can be summarized in
the order Kraatz presented as follows:
Issue No. 1. Whether Judge Frederick was clearly erroneous and without
evidentiary support in finding Kraatz is entitled to Stock Appreciation Rights of
$90,000 based upon the credible testimony of Larry H. Miller that the purchase price
of Heritage was between $3,000,000 and $3,100,000.
Standard of Review: uTo successfully attack findings of fact, a party must
first marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, the

1 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence is insufficient to support the findings." R.L. Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d
666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

a

It is the trial court's role to assess witness

credibility, given its advantaged position to observe testimony first hand, and normally,
we will not second guess the trial court's findings in this regard." Promax Dev'mt
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449
(Utah 1997). As Kraatz noted, u[t]he appellate court will presume a trial court's award
of damages to be correct and will overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous and without
reasonable support in the evidence" Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230,
1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Issue No. 2. Whether Judge Frederick was clearly erroneous in refusing to
award extracontractual damages to Kraatz.
Standard of Review: "[BJecause the adequacy of a damage award is a
factual question, we will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly
erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31, f 6, 973 P.2d 445, 447, ajfd 1
P.3d 783 (Utah 2000). Further, "the trial court is vested with broad discretion and the
award will not be set aside unless it is manifestiy unjust or indicates that the trial court
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous
circumstances." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Thus,
we must affirm the award of damages if evidence in the record supports the award."
Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 115 (Utah 1984).

2
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Further,

whether the parties have modified or amended a previously existing contract is also a
question of fact. See Colonial Pac. Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C.J.R. Corp., 1999 UT App
91, f 2 7 , 977 P.2d 541, 548.
Issue No. 3. Whether Judge Frederick was clearly erroneous in refusing to
award a greater yearly bonus to Kraatz by rejecting the changes Kraatz's urged to
accounting records regularly kept by Heritage.
Standard of Review: *[B]ecause the adequacy of a damage award is a
factual question, we will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly
erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App 31, 1 6, 973 P.2d 445, 447), aff*d 7
P.3d 783 (Utah 2000). Further, "the trial court is vested with broad discretion and the
award will not be set aside unless it is manifesdy unjust or indicates that the trial court
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous
circumstances." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Thus,
we must affirm the award of damages if evidence in the record supports the award."
Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 115 (Utah 1984).
Issue No. 4. Whether Judge Frederick erred by refusing to award Kraatz fees
for experts who did not testify, costs for a dozen non-essential depositions and other
unreasonable costs.
Standard of Review: Heritage agrees with Kraatz that the trial court's
interpretation of the meaning of costs is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT. Ct. App. 404, J10, 38 P.3d 1001, 1003.
Issue No. 5. Whether Judge Frederick erred by refusing to award prejudgment
interest on Kraatz's unliquidated attorney fees, costs, and uncertain damages.
Standard of Review: As Kraatz mentioned, the trial court's decision
regarding entidement to prejudgment interest is a question of law, which is reviewed
for correctness. See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995).
Issue No. 6. Whether Judge Frederick erred in refusing to award Kraatz
damages based upon an increase in the Consumer Price Index.
Standard of Review: Heritage agrees with the correctness standard set
forth by Kraatz, affording the trial court no deference. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept.
ofTransp., 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993).
CROSS-APPEAL
Heritage has filed a Cross-Appeal.

The sole issue is whether the trial court

abused its discretion in awarding $432,941.36 in attorney fees to Kraatz where Kraatz
only succeeded in proving one of seven causes of action against only one of three
named defendants, and where he only recovered a judgment in the principal amount of
$124,118.56, after seeking $3,507,980.00 in damages in his complaint.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for trial court's award of
attorney fees is clear abuse of discretion. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,
316 (Utah 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to apportion attorney

4
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fees between successful and unsuccessful claims. See Paul Mueller Company v. Cache
Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982).

A court also abuses its

discretion when it awards attorney fees that are excessive and not supported by the
evidence. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).
Citations to the Record where this issue was preserved in the trial court (R.
4635-4641; 5059, p. 19-20).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kraatz filed a complaint against Heritage on or about January 21, 1993, alleging
causes of action for (1) breach of contract against Heritage, (2) breach of the duty of
good faith & fair dealing against Heritage, (3) alter ego against B. Wilkinson, (4)
inducement of breach against B. Wilkinson, (5) interference with prospective business
relationship against B. Wilkinson, (6) inducement of breach against J. J. Wilkinson, and
(7) inference with prospective business relationship against J J . Wilkinson. (R. 1-19;
4978-79).

A four-day bench trail commenced before the Honorable J. Dennis

Frederick on August 27, 1996.

The trial court entered Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on or about October 28th, 1996, for no cause of action against
Kraatz. Kraatz appealed that decision to this Court, which reversed and remanded for
"a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including reasonable attorney
fees." See Memorandum Decision, p. 4 (1999 UT App 070). ("Memo Decision").
The trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: Liability

5
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and Damages were entered April 30, 2001, and the Judgment was entered June 29,
2001, awarding Kraatz $621,717.17 as follows:
Principal
Expert Witness Fees
Costs
Attorney Fees

$124,118.56
35,502.09
29,155.16
432.941.36

TOTAL

$621,717.17

Heritage's Cross-Appeal is from the award of attorney fees to Kraatz in the amount of
$432,941.36.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

GENERAL BACKGROUND
1.

Kraatz and Heritage entered into a written Employment Agreement

(the "Contract") on or about May 1990. (Ex. 38; R. 4061-72).
2.

Kraatz filed a Complaint on or about January 21, 1993 (R. 1-19).

A four-day bench trial began August 30, 1996. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were entered on October 28, 1996, for no cause of action against Kraatz. (R.
1681-1717).
3.

Kraatz appealed to this Court, which reversed and remanded "for a

determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including reasonable attorney
fees." (Memo Decision, p. 4).
4.

Counsel for Kraatz submitted an attorney fees affidavit September

25, 2000, at the time he filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

6
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asking for attorney fees of $380,180.00. (R. 4335-36).
5.

Kraatz's counsel filed a supplemental request for attorney fees and

accompanying affidavits on or about March 19, 2001, requesting additional attorney
fees of $65,288.40 (R. 4775-4811).
H.

KRAATZ INCOMPLETELY OR INCORRECTLY SET FORTH THE
FOLLOWING CLAIMED FACTS1:

A.

Lost Wages & Benefits. Kraatz claimed Heritage did not challenge the

calculations of his accountant, Bruce Wisan. At trial, Heritage challenged not only the
conclusions and limit also the calculations of both Wisan and Schmitz, an expert called
by Kraatz, through extensive cross-examination (e.g., 2125, 2140, 2144-2146, 2273,
2288, 2295, 2338, 2458, & 2441), through various exhibits, and through the testimony
of Heritage's two accountants. (R.2177-2180, 2400-2404 & Ex. 333).
1.

Profit sharing. Wisan claimed "adjustments" should be made in

the accounting records regularly kept by Heritage for "two unreasonable expenses,"
i.e., the purchase price and the rent paid to Miller.2 However, Heritage's accounting
records were audited and accepted by the IRS. (R. 2179-80). Further, the Contract
stated that any yearly bonus due Kraatz was to be based on the "accounting practices
acceptable to and used by Company in reporting to American Honda, Incorporated."

1

Heritage responds by designations and numbers corresponding to Kraatz's brief, pp.
8-24.
2
Interestingly, Kraatz claims the benefit of Larry H. Miller's purchase of Heritage,
but seeks to "adjust" any burdens.

7
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(R. 4067).

There is no evidence American Honda, Inc., objected to Heritage's

accounting practices.

Also, the trial court found Kraatz had access to Heritage

accounting records prior to his employment with Heritage. (R. 1855, 2468 & 4996).
Kraatz never objected to the accounting practices while employed at Heritage.

(R.

4996).
2 & 3. Sports Mall and Country Club. The Contract provided Kraatz
Sports Mall and Country Club memberships for "business use." (R. 4067; Ex. 38, Sch.
"A," 1(d) & (e)). Kraatz admitted at trial he never used the Sports Mall for business
purposes. (R. 1859-60).

He also admitted in the twenty-seven months he was the

General Manager, he did not use the Hidden Valley membership for business use. (R.
1859).

This Court's Memo Decision did not overturn or modify these Findings.

Accordingly, there is no basis to support recovery.3
4.

St. George Home Reimbursement. Kraatz claims he was denied

payment for St. George home reimbursements. However, Kraatz admitted at trial B.
Wilkinson never promised to indefinitely pay the differential between the rental of St.

3

The only basis for Kraatz's claims come outside the Contract. For instance, although
he had not played golf, he expressed to his accountant his future intent to play three
rounds of golf with a guest and cart each summer. (R. 2131). This statement is purely
speculative and cannot support any award of damages. See Sawyers v. FMA Leasing
Co., 722 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) (holding damage award must be founded on
rational basis and cannot be based upon speculation.). It is also hearsay, not of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts. See Utah R. Evid. R. 703; State v. Clayton, 646
P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1982).

8
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Goerge home and the mortgage on his Salt Lake home. (R. 1859).
5-8.

Additional Compensation

Kraatz re-asserts claims for annual

Christmas bonus, Jazz tickets, retirement contributions, and warranty income. Kraatz
fails to recognize this Court remanded for damages and attorney fees "under the
contract" - not extracontractual damages. Kraatz admitted the following at trial: (1)
that Christmas bonuses were not included in his Contract (R. 1865); (2) the Jazz tickets
were not included in his written Contract and B. Wilkinson determined who got Jazz
tickets (R. 2142-45); (3) retirement contributions were not in his Contract (R. 1865);
and (4) he did not provide any additional consideration for warranty income. (R. 185758).
9.

Unreimbursed Health Care Costs. Kraatz fails to mention in his

brief that because Heritage was never profitable under his direction, he agreed to
forego non-covered health reimbursements.

(R. 1837-38).

Kraatz asserts he only

agreed to postpone those payments. However, Heritage never became profitable under
his tenure as General Manager. (Ex. 333). This Court's Memo Decision concluded
extrinsic evidence urged by Heritage should not have been considered by the trial court.
(P. 4). Similarly, extrinsic evidence should not now be considered in Kraatz's favor.
10.

Summary of Lost Wages and Benefits. There is no record cite to

Kraatz's claims J.J. Wilkinson lacked experience, or to a comparison of his duties to
Kraatz. The dealership was profitable under J.J. Wilkinson's tenure following Kraatz.

9
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(Ex. 333). Kraatz also claims Miller would have retained him as General Manager
and he would have received a 10% interest in the dealership. However, Miller actually
testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Now, with respect to - is there any doubt in your
mind that Tony Kraatz could run Heritage Honda as a
Larry Miller dealership just as well or better than J.J.
Wilkinson?
A. Yeah, anywhere in the time frame he was at Heritage
Honda. In fact, he and I talked about it on occasion and I
would not have had any qualms about doing it. Your
question was, is there any doubt in my mind, and today,
yes, there is some doubt because of this conflicting
information.
(R. 2090-91).
Miller also testified the dealership had enough capital to allow the General Manager to
run the dealership normally, and that Miller's Toyota dealership, which sells a similar
product, had $23,000 less capital than Heritage during 1992 and the Toyota dealership
still made a profit (R. 2220-21).
B.

Value of Heritage Stock. Kraatz asserts Miller testified he purchased 60%

of the stock in the Heritage for between $3,000,000 and $3,100,000 (R. 2216), and
therefore, the total value of the dealership was significantly higher. However, because
of a minority discount and other factors, Miller testified he purchased the dealership for
between 3 and 3.1 million dollars.

(R. 2216-22).

The trial court found Miller's

testimony to be credible. (R. 5001 & 2466-67).

10
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C.

Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses.
2.

Paragraphs 25, 36 and 37 from the Affidavit of Michael N. Zundel

are replete with inadmissible argument and legal conclusions. See Capital Assets Fin.
Services, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding trial court must disregard
an affidavit containing legal conclusions).

That Heritage identified 30 potential

witnesses does not warrant a deposition of all or most of those persons.
3-

Expert Witness Fees.

The conclusory allegations in Zundel's

Affidavit do not invalidate the trial court's decision in disallowing fees for two experts
who were not deposed and did not testify at trial. (R. 5002-03).
4.

Pre-Judgment Interest. As addressed below, Kraatz is not entided

to claim pre-judgment interest for extracontractual and unliquidated damages.
5.

Consumer Price Index.

Kraatz may have correctly stated the

increase in the consumer price index. However, before that becomes relevant, Kraatz
must have been entided to such an increase. That issue is addressed under argument.
DI.

FACTS MARSHALED IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL COURT'S AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES4
1.

Kraatz purported to categorize attorney fee time and deduct

4

As stated in Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2001 UT App 226, j 41, 29 P.3d 668,
676, cert, granted, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001), the party challenging the award of
attorney fees must marshal all evidence introduced at trial that supports the trial court's
award of attorney fees before ferreting out the fatal flaw in the evidence supporting that
award. In the case at bar, there was no testimony taken regarding attorney fees. Only
memoranda, affidavits and attorney timesheets were filed.
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$12,937.00 spent on claims against individuals. (R. 4336, 4743-51, 4756-59 & 4970).
Kraatz deducted other nonassessable attorney fees of $2,754.50 from the original
amount sought. (R. 4970).
2.

Kraatz subsequently made the following additional deductions:

$2,778.75 for profiling case assessment (R. 4970); $425.00 for time spent drafting the
second cause of action (R. 4745 & 4970); $2,430.10 for 18% of pages of trial brief
addressing tort claims (R. 4745 & 4971); $451 for 3 hours of time spent by K.
Linebaugh and J. Dunn observing the trial (Id.); $757.71 for 1.29% of trial transcript
representing 100% of Larry Don Terry's testimony (R. 4746 & 4971); $1,769.70 for
3.01% of trial transcript representing 50% of J.J. Wilkinson's testimony (R. 4747 &
4971); $2,882.09 for 4.9% of trial transcript representing 20% of B. Wilkinson's
testimony (Id.); $3,651.79 deduction for 37.70% of their proposed Findings and
Conclusions. (R. 4971).
3.

After oral argument on remand on March 31, 2001, Kraatz wrote

the trial court and clarified he had reduced his request for attorney fees through trial to
$225,210.36, which including $139,823.50 through appeal, prior to remand, totaled
$365,033.86. (R. 4969-71).
4.

Kraatz was awarded additional post appeal attorney fees on remand

of $67,907.50, without an evidentiary hearing (R. 5002).

When combined with

$365,033.86 for time spent through trial and appeal, brought the total attorney fees
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awarded to $432,941.36. Thus, the trial court awarded Kraatz all the attorney fees he
requested. The award of attorney fees is based solely upon the motions and supporting
memoranda, including attorney fee affidavits and timesheets. (R. 1220-1300 (redacted
entries submitted to trial court), 4060-4606, 4729-4759, 4773-4810 & 5060-5125).
5.

The total voluntary fee reduction conceded by Kraatz was

$30,837.64. (R. 4756 & 4970-71). This is a 6.65% reduction from Kraatz's original
request for attorney fees.
IV.

FACTS SHOWING TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
WAS CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
1.

Kraatz's complaint against Heritage, B. Wilkinson and J.J.

Wilkinson alleged seven causes of action, i.e., breach of contract, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, alter ego, inducement of breach (separately against each
individual defendant),

and interference with prospective business relationship

(separately against each individual defendant). (R.l-19).
2.

Kraatz succeeded on only one of his seven causes of action against

only one of three defendants. (R. 5005).
3.

Kraatz spent approximately 41.60 hours ($4,596.00) researching

and conducting a statistical analysis of Judge Frederick reversal rate on appeal. (R.
4458-62).
4.

Kraatz did not deduct time for extracontractual damage, for which

he received no recovery.
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5.

Kraatz did not deduct time for claims he failed to prove.

6.

Kraatz did not deduct duplicative time spent by two or more

7.

Kraatz did not deduct time for attorney travel.

8.

Kraatz did not deduct time for numerous attorney conferences.

9.

Kraatz did not deduct excessive attorney time.

10.

In 1993 after the complaint was filed, Heritage offered to pay

attorneys.

Kraatz $308,000 to settle this matter, which offer was rejected by Kraatz's counsel.
(R. 4682, included as tab 1 of Appendix).
11.

In August 1996, just prior to trial, Heritage again offered to settle

this case by paying Kraatz $325,000, which offer was also rejected.

(R. 4684,

included as tab 2 of Appendix).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Kraatz appealed many of the trial court's Amended Findings concerning
damages. In doing so, Kraatz relied on the wrong standard of review for several of his
arguments. Kraatz admits his claim regarding stock valuation is subject to the twin
tests of clearly erroneous, after first having marshaled all the evidence. In an attempt,
however, to obtain a more favorable standard of review, Kraatz couches his arguments
for extracontractual damages and yearly bonuses as questions of law. As noted under
Statement of the Issues above, these issues are likewise subject to clearly erroneous and

14
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marshalling standards.

His claims regarding expert fees and costs, prejudgment

interest, and CPI adjustments are all simply arguments that the damages awarded were
too low.
Kraatz is entitled to damages for breach of his Contract. The award made by the
trial court, however, is neither clearly erroneous or unsupported by the law. The trial
court's valuation of Stock Appreciation Rights should be affirmed, as it was based upon
the credible testimony of Larry H. Miller, who purchased the dealership. Further, the
accounting methods used by Heritage to calculate yearly bonuses were accepted by
American Honda, Inc., and passed an IRS audit, and Kraatz never objected to the
accounting while he was employed with Heritage. Neither finding is clearly erroneous.
Kraatz is also not entitled to extracontractual damages.

This Court only

remanded "for a determination of damages under the contract, including reasonable
attorney fees." (Memo Decision, p.4). Further, Kraatz failed to preserve and raise
most of his extracontractual claims in his first appeal. In either event, he is precluded
from doing so now for the first time in his second appeal.
The trial court's award of expert witness fees should not be disturbed on appeal
because the experts in question did not testify at trial. Likewise, the trial court's award
for deposition costs should not be altered since these depositions were non-essential and
unnecessary in prosecuting this case.
Finally, the trial court's decision denying prejudgment interest for damages that
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were not liquidated or capable of calculation with mathematical certainty should not be
disturbed.
As to Heritage's Cross-Appeal, the trial court awarded Kraatz all the attorney
fees requested, even though Kraatz achieved only partial success on one of seven causes
of action against one of three defendants. The lower court awarded him attorney fees
that were three and one-half times greater than the principal damages he received. In
doing so, the lower court erred because the time entries by Kraatz's counsel are
excessive and unreasonable and should be reduced to a reasonable amount
commensurate with the limited recovery Kraatz was awarded after twice rejecting
setdement offers for more than twice the principal sum recovered.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS ON THE
VALUE OF STOCK WERE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
Kraatz claims the trial court's findings valuing Heritage's stock at $3,100,000
were clearly erroneous. The Contract provided:
Company and Employee hereby agree that the fair market value of
Company's stock, as of the date of this Agreement, is Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($2,500,000.00). Said Value is
hereinafter referred to as the "Initial Value." (R. 4068).
(Emphasis added).
The Contract then provided upon termination without cause, Kraatz would be entitled to
fifteen percent of any increase in the value of Heritage in excess of the $2,500,000
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initial valuation. (R. 4068). On remand, the trial court awarded $90,000 to Kraatz for
his Stock Appreciation Rights.
Immediately after the Contract was signed, Kraatz took over as General
Manager, and during that time, Heritage had the following losses:
1990 loss of $295,515
1991 profit of $5,169
1992 loss of $124,980 (Ex. 333) (R. 4984).
$415,326.00 TOTAL LOSS DURING KRAATZ TENURE.
It is difficult to contemplate a dealership with an agreed upon fair market value of
2,500,000,5 which proceeds to lose $415,326 from 1990 through 1992, could then be
said to be valued at $4,200,000 when Kraatz was terminated. B. Wilkinson testified
the dealership declined 50% in net worth during Kraatz's tenure. Kraatz states on p.
35 of his Brief that the accounting records only reflect decline in net worth of 18.83%.
(Kraatz Brief p.35). Whether the decline in value was 18.83% or 50%, it should be
obvious Heritage did not increase in value almost $2,000,000, as claimed by Kraatz.

5

Kraatz claims the agreed upon value in the Contract is not the best evidence of value.
In support of this notion, Kraatz cites Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), and asserts the time of approximately 27 months between when
the Contract was entered and when Kraatz was terminated was too attenuated to be
accurate. However, in Glezos, this Court cited "extraneous matters" that rendered the
sale price less reliable than the appraiser's opinion in that case. Id. at 1235. Thus,
Glezos is distinguishable from die valuation facts in this case. Kraatz is simply trying
to re-write the Contract.

17
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The testimony at trial between Kraatz's expert, Mark Schmitz, and Larry Miller,
who purchased the dealership, was conflicting.

Schmitz admitted he based his

valuation of more that $4,400,000 on a subjectively determined capitalization rate of
17.5% (R. 2239), after making numerous adjustments to actual income.6 (R. 2238-40,
2286 & 2300). He also based his valuation on an NADA guide of "above-average"
dealers, rather than actually evaluating the Heritage dealership (R. 2322).
In contrast to the subjective, poorly supported testimony from Kraatz's expert,
the court heard testimony from Larry Miller, who purchased a majority interest in the
dealership shortly after Kraatz was terminated. Mr. Miller testified he had purchased
30-35 dealerships at that time, and that he generally pays book value plus
approximately $2,000,000 blue sky. (R. 2217-18). The book value of Heritage at the
time he purchased was $1,100,000. (R. 2217-18). Thus, when you add $2,000,000
for blue sky, it yields a value of $3,100,000.
Kraatz attempts to use Mr. Miller's deposition testimony to suggest he valued
the dealership at more than $3,000,000 - $3,100,000.

However, Mr. Miller's trial

testimony of $3,000,000 - $3,100,000 merely clarified his deposition testimony, which
is entirely appropriate. See Transilift Equipment, LTD v. Cunningham, 360 S.E.2d

6

These adjustments include advertising expense, owner's compensation, rent and legal
expense. (R. 2238).
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183, 188 (Va. 1987) (holding "a litigant-witness has the right to explain or clarify his
testimony, including previously entered deposition statements and interrogatory
answers"); Klaus v. Goetz, 505 P.2d 726, 731 (Kan. 1973) ("Any witness may explain
his deposition testimony which has been taken without the benefit of court supervision
or intervention.").
Mr. Miller purchased 60% of the stock in Heritage, leaving a minority of
shareholders in the dealership. Although the minority owned 40% of the dealership, it
was not a controlling interest, and not a significant factor when Miller valued the
dealership. (R. 2201-02). Under the Stock Purchase Agreement (R. 4073-76), Mr.
Miller only paid $360,000 for a 60% interest. The remainder of the total purchase
price was allocated to items such as a Non-Compete Agreement (Ex. 88) and a
Deferred Compensation Agreement. (Ex. 86), all of which were corporation obligations
to be paid from 100% of the Stock. This formed the basis for Miller's opinion valuing
the dealership at between $3,000,000 and $3,100,000, since the corporation paid for
100% of all other obligations and since he personally purchased 60% of the stock for
only $360,000. (R. 2216-17). This is also why Mr. Miller declared it's not "fair to
cut, paste and glue this deal and try and come up with the biggest number." (R. 2209).
As he stated repeatedly to Kraatz's counsel, "you're mixing apples and oranges." (R.
2198, see also R. 2201 & 2209). Mr. Miller walked away from various prior deals,
which can't be reconstituted. (R. 2209-10).
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Mr. Miller was clear in testifying that Heritage was not worth $4.2 million in
September of 1992. (R. 2200-02). His old discussions to purchase the remaining stock
from B. Wilkinson's four children for $300,000 each was "keeping a commitment" to
B. Wilkinson which the parties had been discussing for "11 or 12 years." (R. 2201).
But if "you talk about the value of the stock, I still say it comes back to 3 million." (R.
2202). Mr. Miller's personal relationship with B. Wilkinson is irrelevant to the issue
of valuation. Further, the children's stock was never purchased for $300,000 or any
other sum.
Kraatz claims the dealership was attractive to Mr. Miller because it historically
had expenses that were "out of whack" (R. 2084) that could be reduced. (Kraatz Brief,
p. 33). ICraatz argues the accounting practices used by Heritage were improper and
should be adjusted when valuing the dealership.

However, the accounting methods

utilized by Heritage were never challenged as unacceptable to American Honda, Inc.,
and furthermore, Heritage passed an IRS audit with only one minor correction of a
mere $4,000. (R. 2179-80). Finally, Kraatz never objected to the accounting while he
was employed with Heritage. (R. 4996). Given the foregoing, there is no basis to
adjust the accounting records, to rewrite the Contract and to artificially inflate the value
of the dealership to yield Kraatz larger damages.
The trial court heard and considered the above evidence in finding the value of
the dealership was consistent with Mr. Miller's testimony of a $3,100,000. (R. 2216-
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22). The court held:
Given the hody disputed conflicts in the evidence, this Court is
left, therefore, to assess the credibility of the witnesses' testimony.
This has been done, and in this Court's view, the more credible,
persuasive evidence is established by Larry H. Miller. (R. 5000 &
2466-67).
This Court must award deference to the trial court's finding of valuation based
on credibility among conflicting testimony. See State in Interest of C.B., 1999 App.
293, 989 P.2d 76,77 ("We review findings of fact for clear error, with deference given
to the trial court."). There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support and
justify the trial court's decision, and there is no basis to overturn the trial court's
finding on appeal as clearly erroneous.
POINT H
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO
EXTRACONTRACTUAL DAMAGES
This Court's prior decision reversed and remanded for "a determination of
Kraatz's damages under the contract . . . " (Memo Decision, p. 4). This Court did not
remand for determination of extracontractual damages outside the Contract. In fact, in
Kraatz's first appeal he asserted the Employee Handbook and benefits thereunder
should have been added to the integrated Contract (Kraatz 1st Brief, p. 13, 27, 29). In
his Reply Brief, he requested "remand for damages beyond his health benefits and
vested stock appreciation rights." (Kraatz Reply Brief, p. 25). However, Kraatz did

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not raise the other extracontractual damage issues in his first appeal that he now claims
on his second appeal, e.g., Jazz tickets, warranty income and daughter's tennis lessons.
Thus, to the extent Kraatz raised claims for extracontractual damages in his first
appeal, those claims are precluded from consideration on his second appeal because this
Court limited the scope on remand to "damages under the contract" only.
Additionally, to the extent he failed to raise those issues in his first appeal, he either
failed to preserve or he waived those issues, and those claims are also precluded from
consideration in a second appeal. Issues raised for the first time in the second appeal
may not be considered. See Bonaparte v. Neff, 838 P.2d 317, 319 (Id. Ct. App. 1992)
("Because [plaintiff] raises this issue for first time in this second appeal, we may not
address it."). See also Mercantile First Na'l Bank v. Lee, 790 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ark.
1990) ("On second appeal, as in this case, the decision of the first appeal becomes the
law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former
appeal, and also of those which may have been, but were not, presented."). This panel
may not overrule the prior panel's Memo Decision, barring clear error or changed
conditions.

See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115

(1995) (Utah 1994).
Furthermore, this Court's Memo Decision held "the trial court erred in
considering extrinsic evidence." Kraatz cites Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., Ill P.2d
1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) and Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) when
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arguing that an implied in fact contract was created to supposedly open the door for
extracontractual damages. However, if extrinsic evidence cannot be used to determine
whether there was cause for termination, it should not be used to attempt to show
Kraatz's Contract was orally modified, creating a windfall of extracontractual damages
for Kraatz.
Kraatz is claiming "subsequent compensation enhancements" for his daughter's
tennis lessons, his future golfing plans, St, George home subsidies, Christmas bonuses,
Jazz tickets, retirement contributions and participation in warranty service contracts.
Paragraph 3.2 of the Contract, entitled "Additional Compensation," provides:
"Employee may receive additional compensation within the discretion of Company for
other services rendered or other duties as assigned by the Company and agreed to by
Employee." (Emphasis supplied). The trial court already concluded there was no basis
for any additional compensation:
Section 3.2 of the Agreement requires Plaintiff to provide
additional consideration for any additional compensation
Heritage, in its discretion, may provide. Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate any evidence of further consideration given by him
for any additional compensation or perks received during his
employment. The use of Jazz tickets, payments for Plaintiffs
daughter's tennis lessons, participation in service contract
companies of Lariat and Ryan, retirement, Christmas bonus, or
St. George home subsidy are not 'compensation' under the
Agreement. (R. 5001).
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This conclusion was not invalidated or reversed by this Court's Memo Decision. In
fact, as set forth above, those claims are not within the scope of this Court's remand for
"a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract."
The evidence adduced also does not support Kraatz's claims. He admitted the
following at trial: B. Wilkinson never promised to indefinitely pay the differential
between the rental of St. George home and the mortgage on his Salt Lake home (R.
1859); the $500 Christmas bonus was not in his written Contract (R. 1865); the Jazz
tickets were not included in his written Contract and B. Wilkinson determined who got
Jazz tickets (R. 2142-45 & Ex. 38); the retirement benefit contributions were not in his
written Contract (R. 1865); and Kraatz admitted he did not provide any additional
consideration for warranty income. (R. 1857-58). Thus, there is no evidentiary7 or
legal bases for these claims. Kraatz asserts in his brief there was no evidence presented
that the 401(k) plan and Christmas bonuses were modified or terminated after he left.
However, there was no evidence they continued unmodified. In fact, Kraatz did not

7

This Court's decision in the first appeal did not disturb the trial court's finding that:
"Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that the parties modified the
Agreement to include any benefits, perks, or compensation not specifically stated in the
Agreement." (R. 1710-11). Kraatz's claim for Christmas bonuses under Heritage's
Employee Handbook ignores the trial court's conclusion, also undisturbed on appeal,
that the parties intended the Contract to be integrated. Kraatz admitted there was no
mention of Exhibit 135 [Employee Handbook] in the Contract, and he also admitted he
did not know of the existence of the Employee Handbook at that time. (R. 1843).
Also, Kraatz testified the Contract between the parties did not include the corporate
policy manual. (R. 1843-44 & Ex. 135).
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present any evidence on these issues at all.
Assuming, arguendo, there is a legal basis for any additional compensation, it
was "within the discretion" of Heritage. As this Court declared, "The ordinary
meaning of contract terms is often best determined through standard, non-legal
dictionaries." (Memo Decision, p. 2). Discretion is defined as follows:
Liberty of action; freedom in the exercise of judgment. Webster's
New Int'l Comprehensive Dictionary 365 (1999).
Any extracontractual or discretionary benefit Kraatz may have occasionally enjoyed
while at Heritage ended when he was terminated. Just as Heritage had the discretion to
grant additional compensation, it had the discretion to withhold it. Parties may reserve
discretion in compensation in an employment Contract.
In Namad v. Salomon, Inc., 147 A.D.2d 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), the
Employment Contract explicitly reserved "other compensation and entitlements, if any,
. . . shall be at the discretion of the management." In denying the employee's claim for
additional compensation, the Namad court noted, "the written employment contract
explicitly reserves to management complete discretion as to the awarding of any
compensation guaranteed in the employment contract itself." Id. at 387.

Similarly,

although Kraatz may have received some of these benefits at the discretion of Heritage
during his employment, such discretion may be freely withheld in the exercise of
Heritage's judgment and cannot form a basis to award additional damages claimed as an
entitlement.
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Also, these u subsequent compensation enhancement" claims were not reasonably
foreseeable by Heritage at the time the Contract was entered into because they were
discretionary and Heritage had no obligation to provide these benefits to Kraatz under
the Contract.8 While Kraatz recognizes the foreseeability limitation, he failed to define
it.
In Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah
1979), the Utah Supreme Court held *[m]ere knowledge of possible harm is not
enough; the defendant must have reason to foresee, as a probable result of the breach,
the damages claimed."

Similarly, in this case Heritage could not have reasonably

foreseen any liability for benefits that were not required to be given under the Contract.
It is not foreseeable under these circumstances that discretionary benefits would
become entitlements to Kraatz.
foreseeable or allowed.
contract.

Not all claims for consequential damages are

Ranch Homes involved the breach of a real estate option

The Supreme Court concluded that costs incurred by the buyer for

architectural and engineering plans, managerial services, and the design of a logo and
brochure were neither foreseeable nor reasonable and would not support an award of
consequential damages. Id. at 625-66. See also Castillo v. Atlanta Cos. Co., 939 P.2d

8

Kraatz cites Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56 n.2 (Utah 1991) for the
proposition that continued performance of services was sufficient consideration to
convert the items that were dispensed with discretion by Heritage into entitlements.
There is no evidence, however, that Heritage's discretion was modified or destroyed.
Thus Brehany adds nothing to the inquiry.
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1204, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding plaintiff in uninsured motorist case not
entitled to lost use of vehicle even though foreseeable because they failed to establish
how many days they had actual need).
Assuming arguendo Kraatz could show entitlement and reasonable foreseeability
for his daughter's tennis lessons, Jazz tickets, Christmas bonuses, etc., he has woeftilly
failed in his burden to show the alleged damage with the requisite specificity and
certainty to recover anything. These claims are also far too speculative to support an
award of damages. See Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986)
(holding damages awarded must be based rationally, not on speculation).
POINT in
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR EXPERT
WITNESS FEES AND COSTS
Kraatz is claiming expert witness fees of $48,186.26. The Contract provides
"the defaulting party shall pay. . . reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees,
and/or deposition costs . . . ." The word "reasonable" modifies not only attorney fees,
but also "expert witness fees and/or deposition costs."
In State v. Billings, 242 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1976), the Iowa Supreme Court
construed a criminal statute with grammatical construction similar to the Contract in
this case. In Billings, the statute read as follows:
Whoever, after consenting to the use of a motor vehicle, . . .
shall, with intent to defraud, abandon such vehicle or willfully
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refuse or willfully neglect to redeliver such vehicle as agreed,
shall be guilty of a felony . . . .
Id. at 737. The trial court ruled the State did not need to prove intent to defraud.
However, the Iowa Supreme Court held "intent to defraud" was an element of the
crime set forth above because "with intent to defraud" was set off by commas and
"precedes and modifies the three verbs delineating the disjunctive means by which the
crime may be committed." Id. at 737. Likewise, in this case, "reasonable" precedes
"expert witness fees," is set off by commas, and precedes and modifies three nouns
delineating the conjunctive means by which reasonable fees and costs shall be assessed.
Accordingly, to receive expert witness fees, Kraatz must show the fees were
reasonable. See Sinclair v. Insurance Company of North America, 609 F. Supp. 397,
409 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding "charge for expert witness fees will be denied because
the experts did not testify at trial, their testimony was not reasonably necessary to the
prosecution of the case and neither consultant provided information that counsel could
not have developed from the known information."). In this case, Kraatz retained two
experts, Walter Hall and Kent G. Schmitz, who neither testified at trial, were ever
deposed or added any known quantum to the development of this case. (R. 5002).
Thus, there is no reasonable basis for awarding fees for these two "experts." (The trial
court already awarded in excess of $12,000 for Kraatz's experts).
A significant part of Kraatz's cost claim is for deposition and witness fees
($13,318.79). However, Kraatz is only entitled to "reasonable" deposition costs. See
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Board of Commissioners v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1272 (Utah 1997).

The

determination of whether deposition costs are taxable is within the sound discretion of
the trial court. Id. The general rule is "that a party may recover deposition costs as
long as the trial court is persuaded that the depositions were taken in good faith and, in
light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and
presentation of the case." Id. (Citation omitted). In Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court
held the prevailing party was not entitled to deposition costs because they were not
reasonable and necessary to the development of the case. Id.
Kraatz took 17 separate depositions9 in this case, however, only 5 of these
witnesses testified at trial. B. Wilkinson (R. 1770); J.J. Wilkinson (R. 2345); L. Miller
(R. 2071); J. Jensen (R. 2400); and C. Christian (R. 2161). Most of these depositions
taken by Kraatz where not necessary or even helpful in prosecuting his breach of
contract claim—the only cause of action on which Kraatz succeeded. For example, the
depositions regarding extracontractual warranty payments were unnecessary because the
Contract did not provide any such benefit. Thus, the depositions of Timothy Dunne and
others from Ryan were unnecessary. Kraatz may not recover time spent by counsel in
preparing for and conducting depositions that were not related to or essential for

9

O. Bryan Wilkinson; Jeff Wilkinson; Larry H. Miller; Jeff Jensen; Clark Christian;
Helen Green; Matthew Bryan Wilkinson, Roland Fidel; Joe Ballenger; Jeff Gorringe;
Andy Bresolin; Jerry Hayes; Pat Davis; Thomas LaPointe; Timothy Dunne; Michael
Gibbons; Shay Curtis. The first five were the only ones to testify at trial.
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development of allowed damages under the Contract against Heritage.
The award of costs sought by Kraatz must also be reasonable. In arguing for
unreasonable costs, Kraatz urges that the language of the Contract means literally all
expenses and costs, even when this interpretation belies the intent of the parties and the
factual context in which the words are used. The word "all" as used in the Contract
should not be read in a technical, limited and literal sense. Rather, the word "alT must
be interpreted in the context of the parties' entire agreement so as to ascertain and give
effect to such intent. See Crestview Bowl, Inc., supra; DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823
(Utah 1978).
In State v. School Dist. No J, 348 P.2d 797 (1960), the Supreme Court of
Montana was faced with a question of construction identical to the instant case. The
Montana Constitution provided that:
The public free schools of the state shall be open to aU children and
youth between the ages of six and twenty-one years. (Emphasis
added).
Id., at 800 (quoting, Const. Of Montana, Art. XI, § 7). A writ of mandamus
had been sought by the parents of a young girl who, under a school board rule,
had been denied admission to the first grade.

The applicable rule allowed

children who reached the age of six prior to November 15 of any year to be
admitted to elementary school at the commencement of the fall term in
September of that year. The child in question missed the cut-off date by three
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days. In upholding the school board's decision denying admission, the Montana
Supreme Court stated:
[W]e shall examine the wording of the Constitution and statutes to
determine what was meant by the framers of the Constitution. In
other words, what does the term 'all' mean? Should it be taken in
its universal and omnibus sense, that is, literally all? Or rather,
was it meant to be limited and qualified to conform to good reason
to carry out the other purposes of the Constitution such as to have a
general, uniform and thorough system of public schools?
We hold the later to be proper interpretation. * * * It would be
very easy to cite examples of absurd results if such a literal
interpretation were made, Statutory or constitutional construction
should not lead to absurd results if a reasonable construction will
avoid it. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 801. To a similar effect, see also, Myer v. Ada County, 293 P. 322 (Idaho 1930).
The specific language of the Contract provides the prevailing party is entitled to
"costs, reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees and/or deposition costs. . . . "
Necessarily, the term "reasonable" must also apply to the term costs.
language must be read to harmonize provisions together.

Contract

See Elm, Inc. v. M.T.

Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89
(Utah 1999), (holding "the contract should be read as a whole, in an attempt to
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions"). Moreover, Courts have
the authority, if not the obligation, to imply reasonable terms when interpreting
contracts.

See Coulter v. Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998)

(implying reasonable time requirement where contract failed to specify time for
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performance). Finally, as Kraatz noted on page 39 of his Brief, in every contract there
is an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Kraatz should not recover

unreasonable or unnecessary costs.
By analogy, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits federal courts to tax costs in favor of a
prevailing party, including court reporter costs, printing costs, witness disbursements
and the like. The statute does not state that an award of costs thereunder need be
reasonable.

Nonetheless, courts have uniformly held that costs awarded thereunder

must be reasonable.
For instance, in Ellis v. University of Kansas Med. Cntr., 2000 WL 1310508, p.
4 (D.Kan. 2000), decided under § 1920, the court enforced a Tenth Circuit decision
denying an appellant's request for costs, quoting the appellate court as follows:
Though 10th Cir.R. 39.1 allows for the taxing of photocopy costs,
Ellis has not provided any explanation as to the reasonable
necessity of the photocopies nor has she provided documentation
regarding those costs. Therefore, we deny Ellis' request to tax the
photocopy charges.
Similarly, in this case, Kraatz has not and cannot demonstrate that the additional costs
he now seeks were reasonable. For example, Kraatz over-worked this case so massively,
Heritage, for example, is being asked to pay $15,432.55 just for photocopying expenses.
Was it reasonable for Kraatz to present the trial court with seven three-ring binders of
potential exhibits on the first morning of trial? Of Kraatz's approximate three hundred
thirty-three of proposed exhibits, only sixty-six were actually introduced into evidence.
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(R. 1354-1386). Should Heritage reasonably be liable for photocopying expense for
hundreds of exhibits never introduced? Innumerable other examples exist of prejudgment
interest requested for unreasonable costs.
Moreover, Kraatz has also failed to categorize his costs related to his breach of
contract action from those separate claims and causes of action upon which he failed to
prevail. Clearly, Kraatz is not entided to costs for claims other than breach of contract.
POINT IV
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Heritage admits Kraatz is entided to prejudgment interest on his base salary,
fixed yearly bonus, demonstrator automobile and health insurance premiums and
unreimbursed health care costs. Kraatz's other claims for prejudgment interest are not
supported by Utah law or the facts of this case. Kraatz is only entided to prejudgment
interest for damages that are complete and capable of calculation with precision as of a
particular time. Kraatz is not entided to prejudgment interest where damages are
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy.

See Klinger v.

Kightty, 889 P. 2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Price-Orem Inv. Co. v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding
prejudgment interest is not allowed "where damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical accuracy"). Furthermore, while the evidence may be

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
33 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sufficient to support a damage award, a higher standard of certainty is required to
sustain prejudgment interest. See Price-Orem 784 P.2d at 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(holding u[w]hile the basis of the 'formula' used to determine . . . lost profits may have
been sufficient for the jury to render a verdict in [Price-Orem's] favor . . . it is too
speculative to allow for the addition of prejudgment interest.").
Kraatz cites Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Land & Forestry,
921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997), for the general
policy statement behind prejudgment interest. Heritage does not disagree with the
policy of awarding prejudgment interest where the amount owing is liquidated and
fixed. However, where the amount is not liquidated and fixed, and where there is
conflicting testimony and uncertainty about the amount owing, prejudgment interest is
not appropriate. See James Constrs., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing "when damages are uncertain or speculative until
fixed by the factfinder, Utah courts have refused to award prejudgment interest").
Under all these authorities, prejudgment interest is not appropriate for stock
appreciation rights, yearly bonuses based on profit, subsequent compensation
enhancements, attorney fees, expert witness fees or costs. Indeed, Kraatz continues to
make arguments for accounting adjustments (Exs. 302 & 328) regarding the valuation
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of Heritage.10 The testimony concerning yearly bonus was and still is in conflict. At
trial, any amounts due for stock appreciation were unascertainable and hotly disputed.
Likewise, prejudgment interest is not appropriate for "subsequent compensation
enhancements.n Even if principal damages could be awarded for these claims,11 which
Heritage strenuously resists, prejudgment interest is too incomplete and speculative to
be calculated with mathematical accuracy. For example, Kraatz had not used the
Hidden Valley Country Club for business while employed by Heritage, yet he
speculates about his future intent to play three golf trips per year taking two guests and
renting a cart. (Ex. 302, Wisan Work Sch. A-1.5). (R. 2131). This unsubstantiated
statement of future intent is subject to the trial court's assessment of reasonableness and
credibility, as well as a determination whether such claims are wholly speculative.
Prejudgment interest cannot be claimed on attorney fees under this Court's
decision in James Constrs., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), holding "when damages [such as attorney fees] are uncertain or
speculative until fixed by the fact-finder, Utah courts have refused to award
prejudgment interest."

Attorney fees are subject to a reasonableness determination

10

The Contract recognizes the uncertain nature of this calculation. It provides fair
market value may be determined by mutual agreement and, if the parties are unable to
agree, each shall elect one qualified business appraiser and the two shall select a third.
(R. 4068-69). Until a neutral appraiser is selected and two of the three appraisers
agree, fair market value at the time of the termination is uncertain.
11
As the trial court determined, there was no consideration for subsequent
compensation enhancement within the discretion of the Company. (R. 5001-02).
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required by law in the language of the Contract. Therefore, they are not capable of
calculation with mathematical certainty before fixed by the trial court.
Kraatz cites to First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (Utah
1982) for the proposition that prejudgment interest would apply to attorney fees because
the amount is fixed as of the time of claimed damages.12 However, that case provides
no guidance regarding prejudgment interest on attorney fees. While the defendant in
J.B.J. Feedyards was awarded $10,000 of his $77,000 accrued attorney fees, with
prejudgment interest on the $10,000, there is no indication how the Court assessed
prejudgment interest, and whether the attorney fees were subject to a reasonableness
analysis. Id. at 597-98, 600.
Kraatz also cites to Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 Ut App 397,
38 P.3d 984, in support of his claim for prejudgment interest on attorney fees. In
Debry, the Court ordered prejudgment interest on past due attorney fees in a divorce
case where the client admitted to both the trial court and this Court that the fees
charged were "reasonable."

Id. at \ 3, 988.

Because there was no dispute as to

whether the attorney fees were reasonable, and because the client delayed paying
amounts clearly owed under the contract, prejudgment interest on past due attorney fees

12

Implicit in Kraatz's argument would be the suggestion that this panel deciding his
appeal should and could overrule the prior panel's decision in James Constrs., denying
prejudgment interest on attorney fees. However, overruling another panel's decision is
only to be undertaken for clear error or changed conditions. See State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
36 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were awarded. Id. at 991. In the instant case, there is no agreement or admission that
the attorney fees charged were reasonable, indeed, that is one of the major issues in the
present appeal.

Accordingly, unlike Debry, Kraatz is not entitled to prejudgment

interest on attorney fees because the reasonableness of those fees is at issue.
We know from James Constrs., Inc. that attorney fees are not fixed and definite
enough to support a prejudgment interest award until they have gone through the
process of determining reasonableness. Like James Constrs., Inc. Kraatz's attorney fee
claim is subject to a reasonableness analysis by the trier of fact, and therefore, there is
no proper basis for awarding prejudgment interest, particularly where the attorney fees
incurred by Kraatz were unreasonable and excessive.
Those fees could not, and in fact, are not determinable with mathematical
accuracy until and unless a prior determination of reasonableness is made.

Like

prejudgment interest on attorney fees, the expert witness fees and costs in this case are
also subject to a reasonableness determination that precludes prejudgment interest. See
analysis of expert witness fees and costs, supra.
Numerous errors also exist with Kraatz's attempts at arithmetic. Prejudgment
interest has been charged on expert fees from the date those fees were billed to Kraatz,
rather than the dates paid. For example, the first billing from Mark D. Schmitz &
Associates is dated March 12, 1996, is the very date upon which Kraatz starts to charge
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prejudgment interest, (R. 4233-34). The same is true of the other experts. (See R.
4239; 4295 (Wisan); 4300-01 (Hall); 4311-12 (Schmidt)).
In fact, Hall and Schmitz's invoices are submitted "per our agreement." Kraatz
has failed, however, to produce those agreements. Are any experts entided under their
agreements to prejudgment interest?

If so, after what past due date does it start

accruing? Bruce Wisan received monthly payments from Kraatz, yet his invoices failed
to charge any interest. (R. 4241-4295). Is Heritage being asked to pay for interest
when none was charged to Kraatz? Heritage should not have to pay for prejudgment
interest if Kraatz is not being charged interest. See Alvarado v. Rice, 614 So.2d 498,
499-500 (Fla. 1993) (holding plaintiff in personal injury case who had not paid medical
bills yet and was not being charged interest was not entided to prejudgment interest for
past medical expenses).
Kraatz asserts prejudgment interest begins when the obligation is "incurred."
(See Kraatz Brief, p. 49, n.3). The Contract provides: "the defaulting party shall pay
all expenses and costs incurred by the other party in enforcing the terms hereof. . . . "
(R. 4065).

However, Webster's New Comprehensive Int'l Dictionary, 642 (1999)

defines incurred as "To meet with or become subject to, as unpleasant consequences,
especially through one's own action; bring upon oneself."

Because Kraatz has not

proven he was charged interest on his expert fees, he is not entided to prejudgment
interest.
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Interest is also being claimed for all costs. Was Kraatz obligated to pay costs?
Was he obligated to pay all costs regardless of reasonableness? Was he obligated to
pay interest on costs? In the Attorneys Fee Agreement ("Retainer Agreement") that
Heritage has moved to become part of the record on appeal, the responsibility for the
costs was transferred to Kraatz's counsel. Pertinent portions of the Retainer Agreement
provide as follows:
3.
The Client agrees to pay the Attorneys for the
services of the Attorneys Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) plus
a contingent fee equal to one-third of any recovery, before
reimbursement or deduction of out-of-pocket costs . . .
4.
All out—of--pocket costs incurred by the Attorneys in
prosecuting the Client's claim, including all court or agency filing
fees, service of process fees, investigatory costs, deposition costs,
reproduction costs, telephone tolls, travel expenses and the like,
shall be recovered by Attorneys out of any recovery in addition to
Attorneys' one-third contingency fee. The Attorneys agree to pay
any such costs and hold Client harmless therefrom . . .
11.
The Client hereby assigns to the Attorneys, to the
extent of Attorneys' fees and the Attorneys' out-of-pocket cost
disbursements, any recovery in favor of the Client by way of
settlement, suit, administrative proceedings or otherwise and the
Client hereby agrees that Attorneys may retain the Attorneys' share
of such recovery. (See tab 3 of Appendix).
As part of their contingency agreement, Kraatz's counsel assumed liability for
entitlement of all costs.

Since Kraatz incurred no liability, he is not now entitled to

prejudgment interest on any costs? See Alvarado, supra. By substituting themselves
for Kraatz, his counsel severed the privity of contract between Kraatz and Heritage for
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the payment of costs and prejudgment interest thereon. There is no privity of contract
between Kraatz's counsel and Heritage. Again, why should Heritage be required to
pay prejudgment interest on costs if Kraatz is not?
Furthermore, this Court issued its Memo Decision in May of 1999, yet Kraatz
waited until June 2, 2000 to deliver to Heritage his Motion for Determination of
Damages. A party causing delay is not entkled to prejudgment interest from the delay.
In Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
held:
Even assuming that interest may be awarded in cases such as this,
[counterclaimant's] conduct precludes an award of interest. The
trial court stated, ' . . . a substantial number of the delays, in this
long-pending case were at the instance of or agreed to by the
[counterclaimant].'
Finally, Kraatz cites to Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Company, Inc., 290 U.S. 163, 16869 (1933) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 354(2) in support of his
argument for prejudgment interest.

In Funkhouser, the issue resolved by the U.S.

Supreme Court was whether a New York statute allowing prejudgment interest was
constitutional.

The Funkhouser Court ultimately concluded the statute was

constitutional. It has no controlling authority in the instant case because prejudgment
interest is awarded in New York by statute even where the claim is uunliquidated."
Thus, Funkhouser is distinguishable.
Also, Kraatz's argument from the Restatement (Second) that prejudgment
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interest should be allowed "as justice requires" is inapplicable in this case. In fact,
Comment d to section 354 states such a determination should be made "in the light of
all the circumstances, including any deficiencies in the performance of the injured party
and any unreasonableness in the demands made by him."

In this case, Kraatz's

demands were unreasonable. Kraatz twice refused settlement offers prior to trial for
principal amounts more than double the award he obtained from the trial court. Thus,
justice requires no further prejudgment interest for Kraatz in this case.
POINT V
KRAATZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX ADJUSTMENTS
Kraatz's claim for a CPI adjustment damages under Law v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass 9n, 185 F.R.D. 324 (D. Kan. 1999) is inapplicable to this case. Law was a
federal antitrust case that is factually dissimilar to this case. In Law, no prejudgment
interest was permitted a private party under federal antitrust litigation in the absence of
a bad faith delay.

Id. 347. No other jurisdiction has cited to this case and no Utah

Court has adopted this method of augmenting antitrust damages to a breach of contract
case. The law in Utah is clear. Prejudgment interest is not allowed unless damages are
sufficiently calculable with mathematical accuracy.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING $432,941.36 IN ATTORNEY
FEESTOKRAATZ
1.

Pursuit of Extracontractual Damages. Kraatz is not entitled to attorney

fees for pursuing extracontractual claims. This Court's Memo Decision "reverse[d]
and remand[ed] for a determination of Kraatz's damages under the contract, including
reasonable attorney fees."

(Memo Decision, p. 4).

In his first appeal, Kraatz

addressed his claim for damages and benefits under the Employment Manual (Kraatz
first brief, pp, 13, 27, 29) and in his Reply Brief he requested "damages beyond his
health benefits and vested stock appreciation rights." (Kraatz Reply Brief, p. 25).
The prior panel of this Court explicidy rejected those arguments and remanded "for
damages under the contract"—not for a determination of damages from all theories
outside the Contract. To the extent Kraatz failed to raise his other claims for
extracontractual damages, he failed to preserve and waived those issues and is not
entitied to appeal from an adverse decision in the trial court. See Mercantile First Natl
Bank, 790 S.W.2d at 919 ("On second appeal, as in this case, the decision of the first
appeal becomes the law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact
decided in the former appeal, and also of those which may have been, but were not,
presented."); but see Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (holding panel of court may overrule
another panel for clear error or changed conditions).
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Thus, Kraatz's claim for attorney fees must be reduced to account for time spent
in pursuit of extracontractual claims, such as 401 (k) contributions, season tickets to the
Utah Jazz, annual Christmas bonuses, reimbursement for St. George home, warranty
income, tennis lessons for his daughter, and private (non-business) use of the Sports
Mall and Hidden Valley Country Club. Kraatz, however, never reduced his attorney
fees for these extracontractual damage claims.
2.

Unsuccessful Claims. Kraatz is not entided to attorney fees for his six

unsuccessful claims, including his claims against B. Wilkinson and J.J. Wilkinson. He
is only entided to attorney fees spent pursuing his sole successful claim for breach of
contract against Heritage.
An award of attorney fees must distinguish between fees incurred in connection
with successful and unsuccessful claims and between contractual claims and noncontractual claims. In Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme
Court held:
the party must categorize the time and fees expended for (1)
successful claims for which there may be an entidement to
attorney's fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would
have been an entidement to attorney's fees had the claims been
successful, (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney's fees. . . . Claims must also be categorized according
to the various opposing parties.
Id. at53.
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Kraatz partially recognized these principles in withdrawing the following time:
$15,691.50
2,778.75
425.00
2,430.10
5,860.50
3.651.79

Claims Against Individuals
Prefiling Claims Assessment
Pleading Drafting
Trial Brief (18% reduction)
Trial Preparation & Presentation
Post Trial Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law

$30,837.64 TOTAL AMOUNT VOLUNTARILY WITHDRAWN (R. 497073).
Although Kraatz voluntarily reduced his claim for attorney fees as set forth above in
small amounts (6.65%), he did not withdraw any time for his six unsuccessful claims
from his discovery and damage analysis ($130,557.75)

or his first appeal

($139,823.50). (R. 4970-73). The time he withdrew for trial presentation was based
on the number of transcript pages used for that witness. That is not a valid indicator of
the proper fee reduction.
Moreover, Kraatz has not reduced his fees at all for time spent in pursuit of
extracontractual damage claims. Kraatz is not entitied to receive attorney fees for time
spent pursuing the unsuccessful or extracontractual claims just because he achieved
limited success on one cause of action. In Turtle Management v. Haggis Management,
Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held:
When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he
should not have a free ride to assert claims against other
defendants with the expectation that the target defendant will end
up paying all attorney's fees, even those related to unsuccessful
and perhaps frivolous claims.
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Examples of time entries13 that should be excluded because they include time
spent on unsuccessful claims, claims against individuals, or issues unrelated to the case
are as follows:
12/18/92
JJD Review Employment Agreement and
other materials in case file; revise complaint to reflect facts re
transactions with Heritage before creation of Employment; begin to
revise all causes of action. 4.00 hours, $360.00 (R. 4345).
01/06/93
KBL Review of County Bar Cost
Containment Guidelines; preparation of agenda for office
conference with opposing counsel and attendance at conference;
telephone conference with opposing counsel re their agreement to
accept service of process. 1.50 hours, $232.50 (R. 4348).
08/20/96
JJD Continue revising introduction section
of trial brief; revise issues of law and burden of proof sections of
trial brief; begin revising argument sections of appellate brief;
receive and review draft of joint pretrial order from opposing
counsel; conduct research re right to recover punitive damages for
breach of contract under extraordinary circumstances; conference
with MNZ and opposing counsel re case procedural matters. 8.50
hours, $935.00 (R. 4436).

13

Analyzing Kraatz's time is difficult given that entries for several tasks are lumped
together without apportioning time for individual tasks. See Webb v. James, 967 F.
Supp. 320, 324 (N.D. 111. 1997) (disallowing time entries where "multiple tasks were
described for a single block of billed time—in many of those instances, where it was
impossible to estimate an appropriate sum to subtract, the Court disallowed the entire
amount."); In re Wiedau's Inc., 78 B.R. 904, 908 (Bankr. S.D. Ill 1987) ("Each type
of service should be listed with the corresponding specific time allotment. Otherwise,
the Court is unable to determine whether or not the time spent on a specific task was
reasonable. Therefore, services which have been lumped together are not
compensable."). Thus, Kraatz's claims where the entries are lumped together should
be disallowed.
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08/22/96
JJD Attorney conference re case update and
assignment to research whether corporate officers have privilege
against tort claims; conduct research re same; draft section to trial
brief discussing liability of corporate officers for tort claims;
intermittent attorney conferences re case updates; conduct research
re rule of contract construction to give meaning to all provisions of
contract; further revise entire trial brief; review materials in case
file and prepare for direct examination of L. Terry. 7.40 hours,
$814.00 ad.).
Additional examples are included in tab 4 of the Appendix.
3. Results Obtained - Where the Award of Fees Exceeds the Principal Sum
Recovered by Three and One-Half Times.
An attorney fee award must be reasonably based upon a number of factors. A
trial court is not bound by the fees requested in an affidavit and the appropriateness of
the requested fee must be evaluated before a reasonable fee is set.14 See Cafferty v.
Hughes, 2002 UT. Ct. App. 105, 1 26, 2002 WL 534793, p.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).

14

It is doubtful Kraatz's counsel would have accumulated such an enormous bill if
Kraatz were responsible for paying it. In U.S. v. Self, 814 F.Supp. 1442, 1446 (D.
Utah 1992), Judge Greene also noted that lawyers bill more time against their
opponents compared to what they bill a client who pays the bill. Id. at 1445. Since
counsel's out-of-court time was many times greater than in-court time, the Court
ultimately decided to reduce the attorney fees to time spent in court plus an average of
2 to 2.5 times in-court time. Id. 1446-47. Under this standard, Kraatz would only be
entitled to attorney fees for the actual time spent in court approximately 60 hours for a
(four-day bench trial plus hearings), times double that amount or 120 hours for out-of
court time, for a total of 180 hours of attorney time. When multiplied by an average
rate of $175 per hour this amounts to $31,500.00.
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These factors include, but are not limited to:
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in
presenting a case, the reasonableness of the number of hours
spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality of
similarly services, the amount involved in the case and the result
obtained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). See also Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).
Analyzing first the results obtained, leads to the conclusion the trial court abused
its discretion by awarding excessive attorney fees to Kraatz. Kraatz's complaint asked
for total damages of $3,507,980 from all named defendants, exclusive of attorney fees
and costs.

He ultimately succeeded on one claim against only one defendant and

recovered the principal amount of $124,118.56.

His recovery is only 3.5% of his

original demand. While no single factor is determinative in arriving at a reasonable fee,
lack of results is certainly a highly relevant factor.
Many cases have considered the amount in controversy in determining a
reasonable fee. See Diamond D Enterprises USA, Inc. v. Steinsvaag, 979 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir.1992), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993), (holding the amount in controversy in
the litigation nis generally the ceiling on the fees that may be awarded pursuant to a feeshifting clause"); F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1250
(2d Cir.1987) (citing "general rule in New York, i.e., that it is rarely proper to award
fees in an amount that exceeds the amount involved in the litigation"); Elizabeth-
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Perkins, Inc. v. Morgan Express, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. Dallas
1977) ("We recognize also that the ultimate amount of recovery is a factor to be
considered in fixing the amount of the fee.").
Further, In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316-17 (Utah 1998) the Utah
Supreme Court also included consideration of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
in determining whether attorney fees are appropriate. Relevant portions of Rule 1.5,
reads as follows:
RULE 1.5 FEES
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an
illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a
definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a
fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained:
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Rules of Professional

Responsibility also preclude excessive fees and consider the result obtained.

All

authorities prompt the conclusion that only under exceptional circumstances (not
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present here) should a "reasonable" attorney fee exceed the principal amount
recovered.
4. Inefficiency of Counsel and Unreasonableness of Hours.
a.

Time Spent Determining Judge Frederick's Reversal Rate.

Part of the attorney fees awarded were for determining Judge Frederick's
reversal record on appeal. As near as can be determined (since nearly all of the entries
include multiple tasks (see fti.13 supra)), the judgment included 41.60 hours or $4,596
spent on efforts to ascertain Judge Frederick's "batting average" on appeal. These
efforts are unreasonable and Kraatz should not recover anything for such an endeavor.
Examples are:
09/23/96
JJD Attorney conference re. strategy for
determining whether to appeal Judge Frederick's ruling; obtain list
of cases involving Judge Frederick, and begin determining how
Judge Frederick rules and whether he was affirmed or reversed on
appeal. 5.0 hours, $550.00 (R. 4458).
09/24/96
JJD Continue to review cases involving
Judge Frederick to determine how he ruled and whether he was
affirmed or reversed on appeal; receive and review transcript of
ruling. 2.80 hours, $308.00 (R. 4458).
10/02/96
JJD Attorney conference re review of
transcript of Judge Frederick's ruling, and case strategy; determine
number of decisions of Judge Frederick after bench trial which
were ultimately affirmed or reversed; review cases decided by
Judge Frederick involving bench trials which were either affirmed
or reversed; conduct research re procedure for seeking
disqualification of judge. 6.10 hours, $671.00 (R. 4458).
Additional examples are included in tab 5 of Appendix.
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In Garden State Auto Park Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc. v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp., 31 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.NJ. 1998), the identical issue was addressed where a
party's counsel spent the comparatively paltry sum of $519 in attorney time
"researching background information and reversal rates" of judges. Id. at 387. The
Federal District Court disallowed all attorney fees for that pursuit, holding *[p]ut
simply, requiring [plaintiff] to reimburse [defendant] for time spent researching this
Court's reversal rates and the backgrounds of certain Third Circuit judges is beyond the
realm of reasonableness." Id. at 387.
b.

Time Spent on Travel is Not Fully Compensable.

Kraatz's counsel spent substantial time traveling to review records and
documents. Time spent travelling should not be paid at the full rate of the attorney.
See Mr. X v. New York Dept. Educ., 20 F. Supp.2d 561, 564 (S.D. N.Y. 1998)
("[c]ourts in this circuit generally reimburse attorneys for travel time at 50% of their
hourly rates").

There are numerous time entries that include travel by Kraatz's

attorneys that should be reduced as follows:
07/26/93
JJD Travel to Kinkos and compare copies of
documents to originals to determine whether documents were
copied correcdy; bring all copies of documents back to office.
4.30 hours, $387.00 (R. 4363).
08/25/93
JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda and
review accounts payable documents. 4.10 hours, $369.00 (R.
4365).
08/27/93
JJD Travel to and from Heritage Honda and
review accounts payable ledgers and other documents. 3.90 hours,
$351.00 (R. 4365).
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Additional examples of travel time entries are included as tab 6 of the Appendix,
c.

Two or More Attorneys on the Same Task.

There are many instances where two attorneys attended depositions or other
matters where such attendance was duplicative and unnecessary. See U.S. v. Self, 818
F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (D. Utah 1992) ("Presence of multiple counsel at hearings and
court proceedings often is duplicative and unnecessary. . . Excessive review of
documents, motions, memoranda and the work of other counsel may represent lack of
coordination among counsel or unnecessary overlap of effort for which clients ought
not to be charged."). Examples of duplicative time entries are as follows:
01/13/94
KBL Attorneys
conference
with Kent
Schmidt. .80 hours, $124.00.
01/13/94
JJD Gather materials and prepare for
conference with K. Schmidt; conference with K. Schmidt re
valuation of dealership; telephone calls to T. Kraatz re arrangement
of meeting between T. Kraatz and K. Schmidt. 3.10 hours,
$279.00.
01/13/94
MNZ Conference with Kent Schmidt re
valuation of dealership. 3.50 hours, $490.00 (R. 4373).
03/23/94
MNZ Prepare for and depose JJ Wilkinson.
5.8 hours, $812.00.
03/23/94
KBL Attendance at J.J. Wilkinson deposition
and related attorneys conferences. 1.3 hours, $201.50 (R. 4382).
03/30/94
MNZ Prepare for and attend second day of
deposition of JJ Wilkinson; prepare for deposition of Matt
Wilkinson. 7.50 hours, $1,050.
03/30/94
KBL Attendance at JJ Wilkinson deposition
and attorneys conference re same. 4.40 hours, $682.00 (R. 4383).
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03/31/94
MNZ Prepare for and attend deposition of
Matt Wilkinson. 5.0 hours, $700.00.
03/31/94
KBL Attendance
at
Matt
Wilkinson
deposition and attorneys conference. 3.5 hours, $542.50 (R.
4383).
04/06/94
MNZ Prepare for second day of deposition of
Bry Wilkinson and take deposition. 7.70 hours, $1,078.00.
04/06/94
KBL Attendance at B. Wilkinson deposition
and attorneys related conferences. 5.30 hours, $821.50.
04/06/94
JJD Attend and summarize testimony in
deposition of B. Wilkinson; conference with M. Zundel and K.
Linebaugh re deposition strategy. 5.20 hours, $468.00 (R. 4384).
09/20/96
JJD Travel to and from and attend Judge
Frederick's ruling; attorney conferences re report on ruling;
attorney conference re case strategy. 1.70 hours, $187.00.
09/20/96
WGM Attorney conference re ruling and
alternatives for further action. .40 hours, $62.00.
09/20/96
MNZ Appear at court and receive ruling;
discuss ruling with client and partners. 2.6 hours, $390.00.
09/20/96
TZ Attend ruling hearing.
.70 hours,
$42.00.
09/20/96
KBL Attendance at court for ruling. .60
hours, $99.00. (R. 4453).15
09/20/96
$214.50.

JMD Post mortem with MNZ. 1.30 hours,

Additional examples are included as tab 7 of the Appendix.
d.

Time Spent in Attorney Conferences.

Kraatz's entries reveal numerous attorney conferences. However, attorneys

15

As can be seen in this group of time entries, no less than five people from Plaintiffs
legal team attended Judge Frederick's ruling.
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should not recover fees for such attorney conferences, as they are wasteful, duplicative
and excessive- See O'Rear v. American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, Inc.,
144 F.R.D. 410, 415 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding, "this court finds excessive all of the
various attorney conferences"); In re Wiedau's, Inc., 78 B.R. 904, 908 (Bankr. S.D.
111. 1987) ("While some intraoffice conferences may be necessary, no more than one
attorney may charge for it unless an explanation of each attorney's participation is
given.").
Examples of attorney conferences billed are:
11/10/92
JJD Conference with T. Kraatz re additional
factual information necessary for drafting demand letter;
conference with K. Linebaugh and M. Zundel re strategy for
drafting demand letter. 3.3 hours, $280.50.
11/10/92
KBL File review and office conference with
client; attorneys conference re demand letter. 3.5 hours, $525.00.
11/10/92
MNZ Attend meeting
with
client re
preparation of submitting demand letter. 1.5 hours, $195.00 (R.
4338).
12/10/92
KBL Attorneys conference re form of
demand letter. 2.10 hours, $325.50.
12/10/92
MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh and J.
Devashrayee re elements of damage and substance of demand
letter; revise letter. 3.0 hours, $420.00 (R. 4341).
06/17/93
KBL Redrafting and editing papers for
presentation to client; office conference with Mr. And Mrs. Kraatz
agreeing on settlement approach. 3.10 hours, $480.50.
06/17/93
MNZ Conference with K. Linebaugh re
litigation and settlement strategy. 2.80 hours, $392.00 (R. 4351).
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12/30/93
JJD Conference with K. Linebaugh, M.
Zundel and T. Kraatz re status of case and case strategy. 3.0
hours, $270.00
12/30/93
KBL Attorneys conference with client re
status of proof and possible settlement strategy. 3.0 hours,
$465.00.
12/30/93
MNZ Review financial information prepared
by Tony and compare income statements over time to identify
trends and costs of Brys participation in dealership. Conference
with K. Linebaugh and J. Devashrayee re evidence to support
allegations of complaints and call to Tony Kraatz re preliminary
conclusions based upon my review of financial information; call to
potential expert witnesses. 6.0 hours, $840.00 (R. 4372).
02/05/94
JJD Conference with M. Zundel, T. Kraatz
and C. Turner re responses to defendants first set of
interrogatories, and other case strategy. 2.0 hours, $180.00.
02/05/94
MNZ Conference with Tony Kraatz, J.
Devashrayee and C. Turner re responses to discovery requests;
draft additional responses to defendants interrogatories.
02/05/94
CT Conference with M. Zundel, J.
Devashrayee and Tony Kraatz re discovery responses; review
clients documents. 2.5 hours, $150.00 (R. 4376).
Time spent in attorney conferences should not be awarded to Kraatz, as they were
unnecessary, duplicative, and excessive.

Many additional examples of attorney

conferences are included in tab 8 of Appendix.
5.

Rejection of Settlement Offers - For More Than Double the

Principal Sum Recovered. Kraatz brought suit for $3,507,980 in damages. (R. 19).
Twice before trial, Heritage offered to settle for a principal sum exceeding by more
than twice his limited recovery of $124,118.56 principal. Defendants offered to settle
this matter after filing of the complaint in 1993 for $308,000, which offer was rejected
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by letter from Kraatz's counsel. (R. 4682; tab 1 of Appendix). Shortly before trial, in
August, 1996, counsel and the parties met again to discuss settlement.

In that

conference, Defendants' counsel made an opening settlement offer of $325,000. (R.
4684; tab 2 of Appendix). Kraatz and his counsel, Zundel, were so insulted by this
offer, they ceased further discussions., made no counter-offer and abruptly left the
meeting.
In determining an award of attorney fees, prior offers of settlement should be
considered. In Greenwich Film Productions, S.A. v. DRGRecords, Inc., 40 USPQ.2d
1223, 1996 WL 502336 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), the plaintiff prevailed in a copyright
infringement case and was entitled to "reasonable attorney fee" as part the costs by
statute. Id. at 1. The defendant offered $30,000 to settle the matter before it was filed,
and the case was later settled for $70,000 on the eve of trial. The Greenwich court held
that

u

[s]ince plaintiffs unreasonable demand [$1,000,000] resulted in expensive

litigation it would be unfair to permit plaintiff to recover the resulting costs." Id. The
Greenwich court awarded plaintiffs counsel attorney fees of only $10,000 (where
$259,188.25 in attorney fees and expenses were sought) holding:

^

Settlements are to be encouraged and a party to an action in
which attorney's fees may be awarded should not be allowed to
believe that it can reject a reasonable settlement offer and still
recover the full amount of its attorney's fees if ultimately it
recovers little more than the original offer.
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Id.

The Court also went on to state that consideration of negotiations was not a

violation of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because an attorney fee
determination was "another purpose" outside the purview of Rule 408. It declared:
While determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's
fees is not specifically mentioned as a purpose for which
evidence of a settlement offer may be considered, strong public
policy consideration support its admissibility for that purpose.
(Citation omitted).
When considering the recovery Kraatz ultimately obtained in light of the
settlement offers rejected his attorney fees were excessive. No award should be made
for fees incurred after the first settlement offer was rejected.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Amended Findings concerning Stock Appreciation Rights,
extracontractual damages and yearly bonus were not clearly erroneous. The Amended
Findings on expert witness fees and costs, prejudgment interest and the CPI are well
supported by the facts and no legal basis exists to reverse those awards.
The amount awarded to Kraatz for attorney fees should be reduced to more
accurately reflect the results obtained, to eliminate time spent on unsuccessful claims,
as well as duplicative, unreasonable and excessive time spent by counsel and to reflect
his rejection soon after commencement of the litigation and again before trial of
settlement offers for more than double the principal sum recovered.

Finally, since

Kraatz's counsel agreed to a one-third contingency fee, attorney fees should be limited
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to $41,372.85 ($124,118.56 + 1/3).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jf^_

day of May, 2002.

Donald 3. Winder, Esq,
Gerry B. Holman, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee and Cross-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the Brief of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant and Addendum to Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this L^ day of _ r W _ _ _ , 2002, to:

Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Michael N. Zundel, Esq.
James A. Boevers, Esq.
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

2410\002\appcab\brief.2
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Heritage Appendix
Case No. 20010598-CA

1.

July 15, 1993 letter re: Settlement

2.

August 23, 1996 letter re: Settlement

3.

Documents Produced by Kraatz at 03/21/01 Hearing on Remand, and Subject to
Motion to Supplement Record filed by Heritage.

4.

Attorney time entries re: Unsuccessful Claims

5.

Attorney time entries re: Judge Frederick's Reversal Rate on Appeal

6.

Attorney time entries re: Travel

7.

Attorney time entries re: Two or More Attorneys on Same Task

8.

Attorney time entries re: Attorney Conferences
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VIA Pars-nrn-.B! N O . 532-370S
and FIRST CLASH Marr.
Dennis V. Haslam
Winder & Haslam
175 West 200 South, #4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Kraatz v. Heritage Honda, et al.

Dear Dennis:
This letter will confirm that on July 9, 1993, you orally
communicated to us the Defendants' latest offer to settle the
subject litigation.
It is our understanding that such offer
consisted of the following:
All of B. Wilkinson's interest in
Lariet Holding valued at approximately

$ 85,000

Cash in the amount of

$175,000

24 monthly installments of
$2,000 each

$ 48,000

We have discussed the offer with Mr. Kraatz. Please be
advised that the offer is respectfully rejected. Please be further
advised that Mr. Kraatz does not wish to make any counter-offer.
Therefore it should be understood that none of the previous offers
to settle made by any of the parties or their agents are still
extant.
*
We believe the case should be settled, and we will never
foreclose the possibility of settlement. However, we consider the
Defendants' last offer to be so unrealistic that Mr. Kraatz has no
alternative but to prosecute his claims. We intend to do that as
quickly and efficiently
asHunter
possible.
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July 15, 1993
Page 2

We are not s a t i s f i e d with the Defendants' responses t o
our interrogatories. However, that will be the subject of another
l e t t e r d i r e c t l y to the Defendants' counsel of record.
We w i l l
i n s i s t that the Defendants promptly give us complete answers t o the
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and immediately upon receipt of those supplemental
responses, we w i l l commence talcing depositions. In the meantime,
we w i l l begin the document inspection agreed to by the Defendants.
Even though i t did not result in a settlement, we
appreciate you and Mr. Miller meeting with us on June 28, 1993. We
are sorry that t h i s matter could not have been resolved a t t h i s
time.
Kindest personal regards.
Very truly yours,
JARDIflE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
• A Professional Corporation

Kent B Linebaugh
JBL:c*\L\U33
cc: Anthony Kraati
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WINDER &H*w*AM.
BUSINESS .\HD niAL AHORNEYS
DENNIS V. RASLAM
SUITE 4000
17J TEST VX3 SOUTH
BO. BOX 266S
SAULAXEcrnr. UTAH

MIO-IU*

FAX 301532-3706
PHONE aOUZ2-U2Z

August 23, 1996

VTA FACSIMILE
355-7725

Michael N. Zundel
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1290
Re'

Kraatz v. Heritage Imports
Civil No. 930900312 CN

Dear Mike:
This letter will confirm our conversation in my office on
Friday, August 23, 1996 during which we discussed settlement
of this case. I extended to you an offer from all of the
defendants of $325,000, in cash. You said, essentially, that
the offer was not acceptable. I asked you to make a counterproposal, and you said that you did not have one to make.
Very/truly yours,

DfMtfIS V. HASLAM
DVH/kr
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March 2, 2000

Mr. William Anthony Kraatz
6374 So. Heughs Canyon Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Re:

Retainer of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler and Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough

Dear Mr. Kraatz:
In light of the dissolution of thefirmof Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn, and the subsequent
association of Michael N. Zundel with Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, and of Kent B Linebaugh
with the firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, it is necessary to formalize your
relationship with those law firms. We are writing this letter to you to accomplish that purpose.
As you know, before the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn dissolved, that firm was
successful in prosecuting an appeal of the adverse ruling received in your case from the trial
court in 1996. Shortly after the firm dissolved, we received word from the Utah Supreme
Court that the Defendants' Writ of Certiorari had been denied.
In order to prosecute your case from this point forward, it is necessary to return to the
trial court for an evidentiary determination of the damages due you, together with other
matters such as the determination of the costs and reasonable attorneys' fees which should be
added to the judgment award.
Mr. Zundel and Mr. Linebaugh are willing to continue with the prosecution of your
case pursuant to the Order of Remand from the Court of Appeals. Each of their respective law
firms propose to undertake your representation by assuming the burdens and obligations of the
firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn under your retention agreement with that firm. Costs
incurred by both of these law firms, will be recovered out of any award that the trial court
may enter in your favor and which is collected by you. This is the same arrangement as under
your present contract
with Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn.
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P R I N C E , Y E A T E S <& G E L D Z A H L E R

William Anthony Kraatz
March 2, 2000
Page 2
Mr. Zundel's and Mr. Linebaugh's firms will be compensated by agreement with the
firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn as follows: the new firms' attorneys, associates and
paralegals shall bill their time and shall be entitled to receive 120% of their regular hourly
rates out of that portion of the damage award and judgment which would otherwise be paid
to the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn. This arrangement will not decrease your share of
the amount collected from what it is under your contract with Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn.
Although the firm of Jardine Linebaugh & Dunn is in dissolution, the legal entity still
exists and has a functioning board of directors for the purpose of liquidation. The tfiree law
firms have agreed to the proposal herein contained. It is important, however, that you also
consent. If you do consent, please execute this letter where indicated below and return the
original to me. I will see that Kent Linebaugh, on behalf of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough, gets a copy of the letter bearing your signature.
Sincerely,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
A Professional Corporation

MNZ\jp
APPROVED:

%J2K
William Anthony Kraatz
ZSt-rtt^

MNZ\L\1163
File No. 13407-1
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April 2, 1999
mzundeffajldlaw. cc<n

Mr. William Anthony Kraatz
6374 So. Heughs Canyon Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Re:

Kraatz v. Heritage Honda

Dear Tony:
Enclosed you will find the following documents:
1.
A copy of the Attorney's Fee Agreement we each signed on October 23,
1992. (It astounds me to think that this lawsuit will probably go on for more than seven
years.)
2.
A copy of my letter to you dated November 14, 1996, regarding the
advisability of the appeal and our request to modify our fee arrangement.
Paragraph 7 of the Attorney's Fee Agreement makes clear that we agreed that the
original agreement applied to one trial only and that in the event of an appeal we would
negotiate in good faith a new agreement under which we would be fairly compensated.

Because of that
possibility, we will want to modify the fee agreement to clarify that we receive 1/3 of the total
award or the attorney's fees awarded by the Court, whichever is greater, or some other
arrangements which we both agree will be fair. *
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April 2, J999

uc

Sincerely,

I AGREE

WUiam Anthon'
MNZ/jp
Enclosure
•^NZ\L\4069
No. 50009

F,ie

I
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aappy to meet with you.

ATTORNEYS FEE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made as of the 23rd day of October,
1992, by and between William Anthony Kraatz (the "Client"), and
Michael N. Zundel and the law firm of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown &
Dunn of 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 (collectively the "Attorneys").
1.
The Client, in consideration of services performed
and to be performed by the Attorneys for the Client, hereby retains
the Attorneys to represent the Client in connection with all claims
and causes of action accruing in favor of the Client as a result of
the breach of Client's employment agreement by Heritage Imports, a
Utah corporation, and related claims which Client may have against
0. Bryan Wilkinson, individually.
2.
The Client hereby authorizes the Attorneys to take
whatever action the Attorneys deem advisable in prosecuting any and
all claims which the Client may have against any and all persons
arising out of the incident described in paragraph 1, including
effecting a settlement or compromise, employing other counsel at
the expense of the Attorneys, and instituting legal proceedings by
way of complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third-party action or
otherwise. It is understood and agreed that the Attorneys will
consult with the Client with respect to prosecuting the Client's
claim, and that any settlement or compromise of such claims shall
be made only with the approval of the Client.
3.
The Client agrees to pay the Attorneys for the
services of the Attorneys Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) plus a
contingent fee equal to one-third of any recovery, before
reimbursement or deduction of out-of-pocket costs, on the Client's
claims, regardless of whether such recovery is achieved by
settlement before or after commencement of suit or administrative
proceedings. However, the Attorneys shall not be compensated with
respect to any amounts paid to the Client as workers compensation
or unemployment benefits as a matter of statutory right and without
the efforts of the Attorneys.
In the event of a structured
settlement (that is a recovery that is payable to the Client over
a period of time rather than a lump sum), then and in that event,
the contingent fee to which the Attorneys will be entitled shall be
equal to one-third of the present value of any such recovery. In
determining the present value of any such structured settlement,
the parties agree to rely upon appropriate accounting methods as
determined by actuaries, economists or other experts in the field.
The Attorneys' fee computed on the basis of such present value
shall be due and payable at the time of such settlement.
4.
All out-of-pocket costs incurred by the Attorneys in
prosecuting the Client's claim/ including all court or agency
filing fees, service of process fees, investigatory costs,
deposition costs, reproduction costs, telephone tolls, travel
expenses and the like, shall be recovered by Attorneys out of any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recovery in addition to Attorneys' one-third contingency fee. The
Attorneys agree to pay any such costs and hold Client harmless
therefrom, except in the event of termination of Attorneys'
services as hereinafter provided. The Client agrees that if all or
any part of such out-of-pocket costs have been paid by another
source (e.g., insurance), the Client agrees that such source will
be reimbursed out of any recovery, and the Attorneys are hereby
authorized to make such disbursements out of any recovery to the
entities or persons entitled thereto.
5.
Client agrees to hire other professionals who may be
necessary to prosecute Client's claim, such as accountants or
appraisers, at Client's own expense.
6.
Recovery, as the term is used herein, shall mean all
monetary awards, including Attorneys' fees, costs and expenses
awarded by any court of competent jurisdiction or any
administrative agency, as well as any special, general and punitive
damages.
7.
This Agreement is applicable to all proceedings
through one trial. In the event an appeal and/or a second trial is
necessary, the parties agree that they will negotiate in good faith
a new Attorneys' fee Agreement with respect to any such additional
proceedings.
8.
The Client retains the right to discharge the
Attorneys from prosecuting the Clients' claims at any time before
settlement or trial, but in the event of such discharge, the Client
shall remain obligated for payment of reasonable Attorneys' fees to
the Attorneys for services performed up to the date of such
discharge, based on the Attorneys' standard hourly rates, and for
out-of-pocket expenses paid or incurred by Attorneys in connection
with Client's claim. If this paragraph becomes applicable, then
Client shall receive credit against his obligations to Attorneys
for the $10,000.00 paid in connection with the execution of this
agreement.
9.
The Attorneys are hereby authorized to investigate
fully any claims the Client may have with respect to the incidents
described above.
If the Attorneys decide that it is in the
Client's best interest to file a lawsuit or other legal proceeding
on behalf of the Client, the Attorneys have the authority to
prepare and prosecute such proceedings. However, if at any time,
having made reasonable investigation and inquiry of the Client's
claims, the Attorneys determine that it is not feasible or proper
for the Attorneys to prosecute such claims, the Attorneys shall
notify the Client of the results of such investigation in a timely
fashion and may withdraw from representing the Client pursuant to
this Agreement, without further compensation to the Attorneys
except for payment of reasonable Attorneys' fees for services
performed, based on Attorneys' standard hourly rates, and out-of2
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pocket costs and disbursements previously paid or incurred. If
this paragraph becomes applicable, then Client shall receive credit
against his obligations to Attorneys for the $ 10,000.00 paid in
connection with the execution of this agreement.
10. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 9, the
Attorneys may withdraw from representing the Client with respect to
the subject matter of this Agreement, if in the opinion of the
Attorneys, the matter should be settled or the Client is advised in
writing that in the Attorneys' opinion further litigation would be
detrimental to the Clients' best interest, and the Client nonetheless elects to disregard the Attorneys' opinion. Upon any such
withdrawal of representation, the Attorneys shall be entitled to
reasonable Attorneys' fees for services performed before the time
of such withdrawal, provided however that such Attorneys' fee shall
not exceed the fees that would have been due on the basis of any
settlement recommended by the Attorneys. If this paragraph becomes
applicable, then Client shall receive credit against his obligations to Attorneys for the $10,000.00 paid in connection with the
execution of this agreement.
11. The Client hereby assigns to the Attorneys, to the
extent of Attorneys' fees and the Attorneys' out-of-pocket cost
disbursements, any recovery in favor of the Client by way of
settlement, suit, administrative proceedings or otherwise and the
Client hereby agrees that the Attorneys may retain the Attorneys'
share of such recovery. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-41, the
Attorneys have and claim a lien, securing payment of the amounts
due under this agreement, on Client's cause of action and claims.
12. The Client acknowledges that the Attorneys have made
no guaranty with respect to the success of any settlement
negotiations, trial or appeal with respect to the Client's claims,
and that all expressions by the Attorneys as to the outcome of such
claims are opinions only.
13. The Client agrees to fully cooperate with the
Attorneys in the investigation, preparation and prosecution of the
Client's claims, and further agrees to honor the judgment of the
Attorneys respecting matters of law and strategy in the prosecution
of such claims for so long as the Client elects to retain the
services of the Attorneys.
//
//
//
//

3
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
Attorneys Fee Agreement as of the date first above written.
CLIENT:

William Anthony iSraatz
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation

\MNZ\D\334
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2(a)

01/05/93

4

02/18/94

4

03/07/94

MNZ

JJD

MNZ

Review complaint redrafted by K.
Linebaugh; conference with K.
Linebaugh re theories of recovery
and additional elements of
damages.

0.75

1.70

Review Heritage Imports v.
Universal Underwriters Insurance
case file at Third District Court;
report results of review to K.
Linebaugh.

153.00

(R. 4378).

Call from Tony re Universal
Warranty documents.

0.20

28.00
(R. 4380).

4

4

04/07/94

04/08/94

CT

CT

Review and analyze vendor fies
Bloomingtonf Fort-Dougfas/Hidden
Valley and Willowcreek Country
Clubs.
Continue review and analysis of
country dub files.

for

3.00

1.00
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180.00

60.00
(R. 4384).'

MNZ

03/18/96

Conference with Con Gray and
Tony Kraatz re value and
penetration of sales of Ryan service
contracts.

135.00

0.90

Page 69

004422

4

05/16/96

TP

4

05/16/96

4

05/17/96

09/26/97

Draft letter to Tony re Volume III of
his deposition; telephone
conference with court reporter in
Chicago to verify review of files to
venfy our documents; conference
with M N Z re deposition and prepare
for Lariat-Ryan warranties;
telephone conference with Jennifer
Faik re Rick Warner checks.

2.30

149.50

MNZ

Conference with paralegal re
deposition preparation.

0.30

45.00

MNZ

Prepare for and depose Ryan
Insurance (Mr. Tim Dunn) re service
contracts sold by heritage Honda.

1.50

225.00

JBG

Complete initial draft of legal
argument re misconstruction of
terms refusal, indude, and herein,
and legal argument ne applicability
of handbook; office conference with
M. Zundei re brief issues and re
additional legal argument re thai
courts use of ambiguous rectal to
Engraft substantive provisions on
operative portions of agreement

(R. 4426).

8.60

1247.00

(R. 4475).

01/27/QQ JWM RESEARCH AVAILABILITY CF DAMAGES
3J20
283.C0
RECOVERY
CF
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(R. 4804).
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9

09/25/96

JJD

Telephone conference with M.
Zundefc review summary of cases
decided by Judge Frederick to
determine how Judge Frederick
ruled and which decisions were
affirmed and reversed by appellate
courts.

0.90

99.00

9

09/30/96

JJD

Attorney conference re report on
review of Judge Frederick's cases
in which he was affirmed or
reversed on appeal, and case
strategy.

0.30

33.00

9

10/02/96

MNZ

Conference with J.J. Devashrayee
re merits of appeal.

0.70

105.00

9

10/02/96

JJD

Attorney conference re review of
transcript of Judge Frederick's
ruling, and case strategy; determine
number of decisions of Judge
Frederick after bench trial which
were uttimateiy affirmed or
reversed; review cases decided by
Judge Frederick involving bench
trials which were either affirmed or
reversed; conduct research re
procedure for seeking
disqualification of judge.

6.10

671.00

Page 1

10/03/96

MNZ

Conference with J.J. Devashrayee
re statistical analysts of appeals
and decisions by Judge Frederick
(.5); research issues re attorney's
fees and risks for loss to Tony
Kraatz (.5); prepare letter to Mark
Schmfe re billings (.5).

1.50
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225.00

(R. 4459).

10/03/S6

10/07/96

10/08/96

JJD

JJD

JJD

Attorney conference re report on
results of research re (1) cases
cited by Judge Frederick affirmed or
reversed on appeal dealing only
with civil cases and excluding jury
verdicts and motions, and (2)
procedure for challenging
qualifications of Judge Frederick to
continue in case; review cases
decided by Judge Frederick
reversed by appellate courts to
determine basis for which cases
were reversed; report results of
review to M. Zundel; further review
cases decided by Judge Frederick
which were reversed by appellate
courts to determine if cases were
reversed where evidence
introduced at trial did not support
findings; conduct research re right
of victorious party on contract
dispute to recover attorney's fees.

8.90

Continue to review cases decided
by Judge Frederick which were
reversed on appeal to determine
basis for reversal.

1.20

Further review cases re right of
victorious party in litigation to
recover attorney's fees pursuant to
contract review case law re
reversal oftowercourt decision
based onfindingsnot conforming to
evidence; complete preliminary
review of afl cases decided by
Judge Frederick which were
reversed on appeai to determine
whether reversal was based on
findings not conforming to
evidence.

5.70

979.00

(R. 4459).

132.00

(R. 4459).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

627.00

(R. 4460).

9

10/09/96

JJD

Attorney conference re assignment
to determine expert witness fees
incurred or advanced on behalf of
client in preparation for sending
letter to M Schmitz; review prebilis
and expert witness fee materials in
case file to determine expert
witness fees incurred or advanced
on behalf of client and revise letter
to M. Schmitz to reflect accurate
numbers; attorney conference re
report on results of research re
reversals by appellate court of
Judge Frederick's decisions and
Mr. Kraatfs potential liability for
attorney's fees if unsuccessful on
appeal; telephone conference with
M. Zundel and S. Stoker re
experience with Judge Frederick on
remand of case that had been
reversed by appellate court; review
notes, research and other materials
in casefile;draft outline of office
memorandum to M. Zundel
memorializing results of review and
research; begin drafting
memorandum.

5.90
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549.00

9

10/10/96

10/29/96

9

10/29/96

JJD

JJD

JJD

Complete initial draft of
memorandum to M. Zundei re
statistics concerning Judge
Fredenck's record on appeal,
potential liability to T. Kraatz for
attorney's fees if unsuccessful on
appeal, and procedure for seeking
disqualification of Judge Fredenck if
case is remanded; shepardize
cases cited in memorandum; review
prebills and other materials in case
file, prepare updated summary of
costs incurred in case, expert
witness fees advanced on behalf of
T. Kraatz expert witness fees to be
advanced on behalf of T. Kraatz,
and amounts owing to firm by T.
Kraatz; review additional case law
re liability for attorney's fees to
prevailing party on appeal.

4.30

473.00

(R. 4461).

Telephone call from M. Zundei re
Judge Frederick's record on appeal
for last two years; conduct analysis
of Judge Frederick's record on
appeal for last two years and
telephone call to M. Zundei re
report on analysis; copy cases
evidencing bench trials conducted
by Judge Frederick subject to
appeal; conduct research re
standard of appellate review.

0.30

Telephone call from M. Zundei re
Judge Frederick's record on appeal
for last two years; conduct analysis
of Judge Frederick's record on
appeal for last two years and
telephone call to M. Zundei re
report on analysis; copy cases
evidencing bench trials conducted
by Judge Frederick subject to
appeal; conduct research re
standard of appellate review.

0.30

83.00

(R. 4462).
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88.00

(R. 4462)
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4

07/26/93

JJD

Travel to Kinkos and compare
copies of documents to originals to
determine wnether documents were
copied correctly; bring ail copies of
documents back to office.

4.30

387.00

(R. 4363).

4

08/23/93

JJD

Travel to and from Heritage Honda
and meet with Helen Green and
counsel for Heritage Honda to
discuss production of documents
requested.

5.00

450.00

4

08/24/93

JJD

Travel to and from Heritage Honda
and review accounts payable
documents; telephone conference
with T. Kraatz re arrangement for T.
Kraatz to review documents at
Heritage Honda.

4.30

432.00

Travel to and from Heritage Honda
and review accounts payable
documents.

4.10

Travel to and from Heritage Honda
and review accounts payabte
ledgers and other documents.

3.90

4

4

08/25/93

08/27/93

JJD

JJD

(R. 4365).

369.00
(R. 4365).

351.00

(R. 4365).

Page 11
4

4

08/31/93

09/21/93

JJD

JJD

Travel to and from Heritage Honda
and continue to review accounts
payable documents.

4.50

Travel to and review accounts
payable documents and petty cash
summaries.

4.00

414.00
(R. 4366).
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360.00
(R. 4367).

09/23/93

JJD

Travel to and review documents
and financial records at Heritage
Honda.

3.20

238.00

09/24/93

JJD

Travel to and review financial
records at Heritage Honda

4.00

360.00

Travel to Heritage Honda and
review financial statements and
other documents; meet with counsel
for Heritage Honda and arrange for
various documents to be copied.

5.40

486.00

Travel to and review general
ledgers, schedules and other
financial documents at Heritage
Honda

5.30

10/06/93

10/14/93

11/22/93

12/01/93

JJD

JJD

JJD

JJD

Telephone conference with T.
Kraatz re status of analysis of
financial statements; travel to and
review documents at Heritage
Honda; prepare documents for
copying.

(R.

4367

(R. 4368).

477.00
(R. 4368).

6.60

594.00

(R. 4369).

Telephone calls to and from counsel
for Heritage Honda re arrangement
of time to review copied documents
and compare with originals; travel to
and review copied documents at
office of counsel for Heritage
Honda

5.00

450.00

(R. 4370).

12/02/93

JJD

Conference with T Kraatz and M.
Zundel re analysis of financial
statements of Heritage Honda and
discussion of case; travel to office of
counsel for Heritage Honda and
review copied documents in
comparison with original
documents.

6.00

540.00

03/08/94

JJD

Travel to and review documents at
office of B. Wilkinsons accountant

1.90

171.00

(R. 4380).

4^0

Page 26
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^

03/21/94

03/22/95

03/23/95

07/29/96

JJD

CT

MNZ

JJD

Travel to and review copies of
documents at counsel for Hentage
Honda.

1.70

(R. 4382).

Travel with MNZ to First Secunty
Bank Operations Center to meet
with Marie Chambers and to review
documents assembled in response
to our subpoena.

1.20

Review documents produced by
WestOne Bank; review documents
produced by Key Bank.

3.00

Review research in case file and
attorney conference re report on
results of research; conduct
additional research re (1)
acquiescence, consent and
condonation by employer of acts of
employee, and (2) whether
employer may rely on causes for
discharge not originally relied on for
discharge; travel to and from and
review case file at Third District
court obtain copy of latest
scheduling order from Judge.

153.00

72.00
(R. 4404).

420.C

(R. 4404).

7.70
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847.00

(R. 4433).
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MNZ

Prepare for and attend deposition of
Matt Wilkinson

5.00

700.00

03/31/94

CT

Prepare documents for use at
deposition of Matthew Wilkinson;
continue to index boxes of Heritage
Honda documents obtained from
Suitter Axiand; conference with M.
Zundel re preparation of exhibits for
use at deposition of Bry Wilkinson;
begin to assemble the documents.

4.00

240.00

03/31/94

KBL

Attendance at Matt Wilkinson
deposition and attorneys
conference

3.50

542.50

04/05/94

MNZ

Prepare for and attend third day of
deposition of JJ Wilkinson; prepare
for and attend first day of deposition
of Bry Wilkinson.

8.00

04/05/94

KBL

Attendance at JJ and Bry
depositions

5.00

(R. 4388).

1120.00

775.00 (R. 4384).

04/20/94

MNZ

Continue deposition of Bryan
Wilkinson.

7.30

1022.00

04/20/94

KBL

Attendance at Bry Wilkinson's
deposition; attorneys conferences
re same.

6.00

930.00
(R. 4385).

05/11/94

MNZ

Prepare for and conduct deposition
of Bryan Wilkinson

6.00

840.00

05/11/94

KBL

Attendance at deposition of Bry
Wilkinson

3.00

465.00 (R. 4385).
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4

01/23/96

MNZ

Prepare for deposition of Helen
Green (3.0); depose Helen Green
(first day) (6.0).

9.00

1350.00

4

01/23/96

KBL

Attendance at H. Green deposition;
telephone conference with T. Kraatz
re same portions of H. Green
testimony.

1.50

240.00

4

01/23/96

TP

Prepare for and attendance at
Helen Green deposition. Make
copies, locate documents, etc

8.50

552.50

01/24/96

TP

01/24/96

MNZ

02/06/96

MNZ

02/06/96

TP

(R. 4419).

Continue Helen Green deposition,
assist MNZ. Make copies, review
files, etc. Refile documents.
Conference with MNZ. Organize
boxes and indexes.

2.90

188.50

Prepare for second day of
deposition of Helen Green (1.5);
depose Ms. Green (3.0).

4.50

675.00

Finalize preparation for Gorringe
deposffion (1.0); depose Mr.
Gorringe (5.5).

6.50

975.00

Assist MNZ and attend Jeff
Gorringe deposition.

5.50

357.50

split

(R. 4419).
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(R. 4420).

4

02/21/96

MNZ

Prepare for and depose Larry Miller.

10.00

1500.00

4

02/21/96

TP

Prepare copiesforand attend Larry
Miller deposition; draft cover letters
to Tony Kraatz, Walter Hall and
Mark Schmitz re shareholder
agreement

9.00

585.00

4

02/21/96

KBL

File review and attendance at L
Miller deposition.

2.90

464.00

4

02/22/96

KBL

Attorneys conference re materials
for opposition to motion for
summary judgment; attendance at
deposition of L. Miller attorneys
conference outlining damage
possibilities and numbers.

3.00

480.00

4

02/22/96

MNZ

Prepare for and depose Larry Miller
for second day (4.0); prepare for
and depose Helen Greenforthird
day (3.0).

7.00

1050.00

08/29/96

08/30/96

KBL

KBL

Attendance at trial.

Listen to trial (2x).

split

(R. 4421).

2.10

1.60

346.50

264.00

12/12/96

JJD

Continue to review trial transcripts
and other materials in case file;
continue to revise entire docketing
statement

6.40

704.00

12/12/96

JJD

Continue to review findings of fact
and conclusions of law entered by
court attorney conference re
proposed revisions and additions to
docketing statement; review
transcripts of trial and further revise
docketing statement

7.50

825.00

( R .4452).

(R.

( R

4452)

4466).
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03/08/94

KBL

Attorneys conference re deposition
and production of documents
schedule and strategy.

0.20

31.00

03/08/94

MNZ

Conference with K. lineoaugh re
depositions and prepare letter to
Dennis Hasiam re nnancai
statements and deposition
schedule; dictate deposition notice.

1.20

163.00

11/21/95

11/21/95

(R. 4381).

MNZ

Conference with K.3. Unebaugh re
preparation of discovery order,
conference call to Kent Schmidt re
deposition schedule; call to Tony
Kraatz re schedule of discovery and
expert witnesses; prepare letter to
Jennifer Falk re discovery schedule.

3.00

KBL

Attorneys conference re scheduling
and strategy, including tetephone
conference with K. Schmidt

1.10

450.00

176.00

(R. 4414).

JJD

Finalize preiiiranaiy revisions to
prejudgment interest response and
submit to M. Zundel for review;
attorney conference re proposed
revisions to brief, and further revise
brief and submit to M. Zundei;
further revise reply bnef in response
to defendants' objection to
attorney's fee affidavit review draft
of proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law in preparation for
filing with court conduct additional
research re prejudgment interest;
travel to and from and file proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of
law with court organize materials in
case file.

8.30

913.00

MNZ

Finalize findings and conclusions;
call from Jennifer Falk re late filing;
call from Tony Kraatz re
modifications and corrections;
conference wflh K.3. Linebaugh re
findings and conclusions.

7.90

1185.00
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(R. 4456).

4

4

02707/94

02/07/94

KBL

Attorneys conference re discovery
strategy and in- house settlement
meeting.

0.30

46.50

JJD

Review latest revisions to
responses to defendants requests
for production of documents and
interrogatories; conferences with C.
Turner re review of documents to be
produced to defendants, and
revisions to responses to
defendants interrogatories;
conference with M. Zundel and C.
Turner re same; telephone call from
T. Kraatz re revisions to responses
to interrogatories and arrangement
of time to sign verification;
conference with T. Kraatz re status
of case and his revisions to
responses to defendants
interrogatories.

3.10

279.00

(R. 4375-76).,

4

02/15/94

MNZ

Conference with K. Linebaugh and
J. Devashrayee re status of case,
discovery, settlement and legal
theories.

3.50

490.00

4

02/15/94

JJD

Conference with K, Linebaugh, M.
Zundel and C. Turner re case
strategy; conference with M. Zundel
re documents which have not been
produced by defendants; review
notes of comparisons of documents
which have been produced to
document requests, and prepare list
of missing documents for M.
Zundel.

3.80

342.00

JJD

Telephone calls to an from counsel
for Heritage Honda re arrangement
of time to review documents
produced by T. Kraatz and
arrangement of time to review
documents at office of B. Wilkinsons
accountant conference with C.
Turner re confirmation of time for
counsel for Heritage Honda to
review documents; conference with
K. Linebaugh and M. Zundel re
settlement strategy arc ^ther
matters.

1.00

90.00

KBL

Attorneys conference re defendants
insurance claims and our strategy;
telephone conference with client re
same.

O.SO

93.00

4

02/23/94

nr

4

02/23/94

(R. 4377).
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(R.43

3

06/02/93

MNZ

Conference with K. Linebaugh;
conference call with Tony Kraatt re
settlement strategy and prepare
letter to Bill Prater.

0.90

126.00

3

06/02/93

KBL

Attorneys conference and
telephone conference with cfient re
status and strategy of negotiations
and discovery.

0.40

62.00
(R..4350).

3

06/16/93

MNZ

Continue conference with Kent
Linebaugh re settlement strategy.

1.20

168.00

3

06/16/93

MNZ

Prepare fcr and attend meeting with
Tony Kraatz, Wendy Kraatz and
Kent Linebaugh re possible
settlement; conference with K.
Linebaugh re settlement strategy.

2.30

322.00

(R. 4351).

4

01/13/94

KBL

Attorneys conference with Kent
Schmidt

0.80

124.00

4

01/13/94

JJD

Gather materials and prepare for
conference with K. Schmidt;
conference with K. Schmidt re
valuation of dealership; telephone
calls to T. Kraatz re arrangement of
meeting between T. Kraatz and K.
Schmidt

3.10

279.00

MNZ

Conference with Kent Schmidt re
valuation of dealership.

3.50

490.00

WU' ~W "V ';

4

01/13/94

"
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(R. 4373).

4

04/27/93

JJD

Conference with M. Zundel re reply.
to defendants memorandum in
opposition to motion to compel
discovery; conduct research re
waiver of right to object to discovery
requests if such objections are not
timely filed; review pleadings and
other matenals in case file; begin
drafting reply memorandum in
support of motion to compel
discovery.

7.30

657 00

4

04/27/93

MNZ

Conference with J. Devashrayee re
discovery requests and response to
Wilkinsons discovery.

0.80

112.00

4

04/28/93

JJD

Conference with M. Zundel and K.
Linebaugh re strategy for replying to
defendants memorandum in
opposition to motion to compel
discovery; review pleadings,
correspondence, and other
matenals in case file; draft affidavit
of William Anthony Kraatz and begin
revising same; complete draft of
and begin revising reply
memorandum in support of motion
to compel discovery.

4.80

432.00

4

04/28/93

KBL

Attorneys conference on discovery
strategy; review of memo in support
of motion to compel and memo in
opposition.

0.60

93.00
(R. 4359).

3

05/25/93

KBL

Attorneys conference re results of
Tonys meeting with Larry Miller.

0-20

31.00

3

05/25/93

MNZ

Cail to Tony re settlement
discussions with Larry Miller
conference with K. Linebaugh and
report conversation with Tony.

1.50

210.00
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(R. 4350).

)

01/21/93

MNZ

Conference with K. Linebaugh re
Judge Fredericks appointment to
preside over the case.

0.30

42.00

)

01/21/93

KBL

Attorneys conference re advisability
of requesting jury triaL

0.20

31.00

01/27/93

JJD

Conference with M. Zundel re
strategy for interviewing witnesses
to case; review Universal Warranty
Company documents and other
materials in case file.

1.20

01/27/93

MNZ

Conference with J. Devashrayee re
discovery strategy.

0.50

04/21/93

04/21/93

108.00

70.00

JJD

Conference with M. ZundeJ re
drafting of response to amended
answers to interrogatories and
requests for production of
documents of Heritage.

0.10

9.00

KBL
^

Attorneys conference re our
response to amending discovery
responses.

0.20

31.00

Qv.i*
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(R. 4342)

( R . 4356).

(R. 4358).

KBL

11/06/92

JJD

Attorney conference and telephone
conference with cSent re merits and
scheduling attomey/dient
conference.

0.40

60.00

Conference with M. Zundel and K.
Linebaugh re strategy for drafting
demand letter.

0.20

17.00

-

(R. 4338).

11/18/92

KBL

Review of materials to check list
possible causes of action; attorneys
- conference re same.

1.00

150.00

11/18/92

JJD

Conference with K. Linebaugh re
causes of action against
corporation and individuals;
complete draft of demand letter,
begin revising same.

6.40

544.00

12/16/92

12/16/92

MNZ

KBL

Conference with Lee McCullough,
Tony, Wendy. K. Linebaugh, and J .
Devashrayee re history of
negotiations with Wilkinson and
Heritage.

Completed detailed review of C.
McCuilock materials; office
conference with client and L
McCuilock re background facts and
intent of parties to the agreement

(R. 4339).

1.50

210.00

(R. 4341).

2.80

434.00

(R. 4341-42).

01/20/93

KBL

Attorneys conference re form of
discovery requests; editing requests
for production.

1 -30

01/20/93

MNZ

Conference with K. Linebaugh re
discovery requests.

0.50
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201.50

70.00

(R- 4356).

9

11/18/96

JJD

Continue researcn re definition of
"refusal," and review cases found
dunng researcn; attorney
conference re report on results of
researcn; attorney conference re
assignment to review trial
transcnpts and to begin marshaling
faos in preparation for drafting
appellate brief; review notes of K.
Unebaugh and begin reviewing
transcnpts.

7.50

826.QQ

11/18/96

MNZ

Review K.3. Unebaugn's notes and
transcripts of testimony in
connection with the appeal;
conference with J.J. Devashrayee

1.50

225.00

(R. 4464).

re same.

9

08/07/97

MNZ

Conference with J.B. Gamer re
interpretation of contract refusal
provision and other provisions.

2.00

340.00

9

08/07/97

JBG

Office conference with MNZ re
interpretation of contract attacking
findings on appeal, and preparation
of legal argument re interpretation
of contract; begin review of case
documents including findings of
fact conclusions of law, and
plaintiffs trial brief and related
cases.

2.50

362.50

(R. 4470).

9

12/11/97

MNZ

Continue revision of brief, call to
Jennifer Faik; note issues in pretrial
order, conference with J.B. Gamer.

2.50

425.00

9

12/11/97

JBG

Office conference with M. Zundel re
additional changes to brief, review
pretrial order and trial brief;
continue editing brief.

6.20

899.00
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(R. 4478).

03/27/98
Tr.. 2C

MNZ

Prepare for and attend conference
with K.B. Linebaugh, J.B. Gamer
and Sheleigh Chalkiey re
preparation of rebuttal brief.

5.00

850.00

03/27/98

KBL

Attorneys conference re form and
strategy of reply brief.

0.70

129.50

05/11/98

JBG

Office conference with KBL and
MNZ re KBL comments and
concerns regarding reply brief;
begin revision of brief to incorporate
KBL comments and revisions
discussed in conference.

6.10

884.50

05/11/98

KBL

Brief review of materials in
preparation for attorneys drafting
conference re reply brief; attorneys
conference.

2.30

425.50

44 8 0 )

(R. 4483).

02/19/99

JBG

Office conference with MNZ re
initial draft of response to letter of
supplemental authorities.

0.30

45.00

02/19/99

MNZ

Review Winder's letter to the Court
re supplemental authority; consider
necessity of response and
conference with J.B. Gamer re
same

0.50

87.50

-^T

(R
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(R. 4485).

